EUGENE SULLIVAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eugene Sullivan pleaded guilty to felony DUI and appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to discharge based on a speedy trial violation. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that administrative orders tolling speedy trial time limits for hurricane relief precluded the expiration of the speedy trial period.
The trial court properly denied the motion to discharge because administrative orders tolling speedy trial time limits for hurricane relief in Seminole County rendered Sullivan's Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial premature. Even if the notice had become effective, the recapture period would not have expired before the case was called for trial.
[1] A courthouse's customary holiday recess, even if observed by some judges, does not constitute an "exceptional circumstance" excusing speedy trial delays.
[2] A state's request to extend a speedy trial recapture period must be established prior to the expiration of that period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“all time limits authorized by rule and statute affecting the speedy trial procedure" were "tolled" in Seminole County due to hurricanes Charley, Frances and Jeanne for a cumulative tolling period of 15 days”
The administrative orders that provided the legal basis for affirming the denial of the discharge motion, as they rendered the Notice of Expiration premature.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSullivan was arrested on June 4, 2004, and filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial on December 15, 2004. The trial court took no action on this n…
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TORPY, J.
Appellant pled guilty to felony DUI, reserving for appeal the dispositive issue of whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge based on a purported speedy trial violation. We affirm, albeit not for the reason given by the lower court.
Appellant was arrested on June 4, 2004.
On December 15, 2004, he filed a Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial on which the court took no action until January 3, 2005, whereupon his case was called for trial. Appellant moved for discharge contending that the recapture period had expired on December 30, 2004.
The lower court agreed that the recapture period had expired but denied Appellant’s motion finding that exceptional circumstances— the closure of the Seminole County courthouse during the holiday period — excused the delay. Apparently, although not entirely an official holiday, by custom, the courts of Seminole County take a two-week recess near the holiday period. The exact scope and duration of the recess is unclear from the record, but it does appear that some judges did conduct judicial proceedings during this recess. In any event, we conclude that these circumstances are not “exceptional,” as contemplated by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i).
See Jones v. State, 707 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (shortage of jurors during holiday period did not constitute “exceptional circumstance”).
Furthermore, even assuming that “exceptional circumstances” were shown to exist, the State’s request to extend the recapture period would have come too late. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(i); see also Hajal v. State, 864 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (grounds for extension must be established prior to expiration of recapture period).
Even though the lower court erred in its finding of exceptional circumstances, we conclude that we should affirm under the “tipsy coachman” rule because the trial court reached the right conclusion. Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla.2002).
During the time between Appellant’s arrest and the expiration of the speedy trial period, three administrative orders of the Supreme Court of Florida were entered wherein “all time limits authorized by rule and statute affecting the speedy trial procedure” were “tolled” in Seminole County due to hurricanes Charley, Frances and Jeanne for a cumulative tolling period of 15 days. Although the lower court and counsel for the parties had considered the effect of the tolling orders for hurricanes Charley and Jeanne, they had overlooked the order for hurricane Frances, of which we take judicial notice. Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC04-88 (Sept. 15, 2004).
When all three tolling orders are considered, the Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial was premature and subject to a motion to strike. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(h).
Moreover, even if the notice of expiration had become effective at the first legal opportunity, the recapture period would not have expired until the day on which Appellant’s case was called for trial.
AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA, J., and ROCHE, R„ Associate Judge, concur.
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Foss v. State, 24 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…tends to prove or disprove guilt or innocence”). In the context of this case, that issue is therefore untimely. Accordingly, the summary denial of these claims was warranted, and we [*1277] affirm on “tipsy coachman” grounds. See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). AFFIRMED. ORFINGER and TORPY, JJ„ concur. . Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850. . Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.140(g). .Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a).…
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Ramirez v. McCRAVY, 4 So. 3d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…, all justify the emergency administrative orders entered by the chief justices due to the weather emergencies. However, we conclude that the orders should be strictly construed in the context of statutes, as opposed to rules. See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) and State v. Hernandez, 617 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (both dealing with the speedy trial rule). We reach this conclusion because the six administrative orders recite as its authority article V, section 2, of the Florida Con…
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Zoba v. The City OF Coral Springs, 189 So. 3d 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…argues the clerk failed to preserve the administrative order argument as it did not rely on it when arguing to the trial court. We are, however, able to take judicial notice of the administrative order in resolving the issue. See Sullivan v. State, 913 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Administrative Order VI-99-A-3 was later vacated and superseded by Administrative Order 2014-3-CO in February 2014. The current administrative order contains a similar provision to section 5.C., but authorizes the clerk to‘…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Swett v. State, 829 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002)
- Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002)
- Hajal v. State, 864 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
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