PPI, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; DANIA JAI-ALAI DIVISION OF THE ARAGON GROUP, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; MAGNA ENTERTAINMENT CORP., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND HARTMAN & TYNER, INC., A MICHIGAN CORPORATION, PETITIONERS,
v.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF AGENCY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND ELLYN SETNOR BOGDANOFF, A STATE REPRESENTATIVE, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Petitioners sought prohibition relief to prevent a state regulatory agency from responding to a legislator's petition for a declaratory statement regarding the applicability of a constitutional amendment to pari-mutuel wagering. The court denied the petition, holding that the agency had jurisdiction to respond to the declaratory statement request and that petitioners had adequate alternative remedies.
The Division has jurisdiction to respond to the declaratory statement petition because Section 120.565(1) authorizes substantially affected persons to seek declaratory statements regarding agency applicability of statutes, rules, or orders. Although the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize an agency to construe a constitutional amendment, the Division may deny the request pursuant to Section 120.565(3), and prohibition relief is not appropriate to prevent this exercise of jurisdiction.
[1] An agency has jurisdiction to respond to a petition for a declaratory statement regarding the applicability of a statutory provision, rule, or order to a petitioner's par…
[2] An agency has the authority to deny a request for a declaratory statement.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Division has jurisdiction to respond to the Bogdanoff petition for declaratory statement”
Establishes that the Division has clear statutory authority under Section 120.565(1) to accept and respond to declaratory statement petitions from substantially affected persons.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceState Representative Ellyn Bogdanoff filed a petition for a declaratory statement with the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering requesting that the Divisi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Petition For Declaratory Statement cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners seek prohibition relief to prevent the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Parimutuel Wagering (“the Division”), from responding to a petition for declaratory statement from State Representative El-lyn Bogdanoff (“the Bogdanoff petition”). We deny the petition for writ of prohibition because the Division has not exceeded its jurisdiction.
Section 120.565(1), Florida Statutes (2005), states that any substantially affected person “may seek a declaratory statement regarding an agency’s opinion as to the applicability of a statutory provision, or of any rule or order of the agency, as it applies to the petitioner’s particular set of circumstances.” Thus, the Division has jurisdiction to respond to the Bogdanoff petition for declaratory statement. See J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Department of Gen. Servs., 356 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (denying prohibition relief where the petition did not show that an agency order had been entered); Carneal v. Carneal, 873 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (denying a petition for writ of prohibition where the trial court merely scheduled a hearing and there was no action from which to determine whether the lower tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction).
Pursuant to section 120.565(3), the Division has the authority to deny the request for a declaratory statement.
The Bogdanoff petition requests that the Division issue a final order “stating that Article X, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution is of no force or effect until the Florida Legislature enacts implementing legislation” and that the Division has the right to take disciplinary action against any Licensee that possesses or operates a slot machine at its parimutuel facility. “The purpose of a declaratory statement is to address the applicability of a statutory provision or an order or rule of the agency in particular circumstances.” Chiles v. Department of State, Div. of Elections, 711 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998).
We note that section 120.565(1) does not authorize an agency to construe a constitutional amendment. “[T]he Administrative Procedure Act ... is not the appropriate mechanism by which to determine the meaning of ambiguous constitutional terms.” Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla.1978).
Although the Bogdanoff petition asks the agency to declare that the constitutional amendment is of no force and effect until implementing legislation has been adopted, the Division has the authority to deny the request for a declaratory statement pursuant to section 120.565(3).
Petitioners have the right to file a motion to intervene in the declaratory statement action, make their arguments for lack of jurisdiction and if unsuccessful, raise the issue on appeal. See National Ass’n of Optometrists and Opticians v. Florida Dep’t of Health, 893 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Although prohibition will lie to prevent an inferior tribunal from acting in excess of jurisdiction, it generally will not lie to prevent an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. See English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla.1977) (stating that prohibition will be invoked only in emergency cases to forestall an impending present injury where there is no other appropriate and adequate legal remedy).
PETITION DENIED.
BARFIELD, VAN NORTWICK, and BROWNING, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Carr v. OLD Port Cove Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 8 So. 3d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…sues. Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla.1978) (noting that a declaratory statement is not the appropriate mechanism to interpret a constitutional provision); PPI, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 917 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that “section 120.565(1) does not au [*405] thorize an agency to construe a constitutional amendment”). The DBPR did not err in denying Carr’s petition for a declaratory statement. The questions Carr raised in his…
-
W. Flagler Assocs., Ltd. v. State, 220 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ertain undefined terms used in both Art. X, sect. 23(a) of the Florida Constitution and in section 551.102(4), Florida Statutes.” Citing cases such as PPI v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 917 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the Order determined that DPMW could not interpret constitutional language and issues and that it was “unable to answer the questions posed in the Petition.” The Order denied the Mardi Gras entities’ motion to intervene as moot.…
Authorities Cited
- Carey English v. McCRARY, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977)
- Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1978)
- Lawton Chiles v. Dep't of State, 711 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. State, 356 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- Valentin v. State, 873 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Carneal v. Alyson Carneal, 873 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. The Fla. Dep't of Health, 893 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
- State v. Warriner, 893 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)