INDEPENDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INS. CO.
v.
GEORGE NIXON
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Independent Life and Accident Insurance Co. challenged the trial court's striking of its plea in abatement based on an insurance policy provision requiring proof of death to be filed before suit could be brought. The Florida Supreme Court held that contractual conditions precedent to suit, such as filing proofs, are distinct from provisions that shorten the statute of limitations and do not violate Florida's public policy statute.
The court held that the trial court erred in striking the plea in abatement. Contractual conditions precedent to suit, such as requirements to file proofs before action accrues, do not violate Section 4651 because they do not shorten the statute of limitations—the statute does not begin to run until the right to maintain suit has accrued. Such provisions are enforceable unless waived by the defendant.
“Section 4651 C. G. L., 2931 R. G. S., has no reference to thos'e provisions of contracts which restrict the right to institute suit until after certain conditions precedent, such as filing proofs and the like, are complied with.”
Establishes the key distinction between conditions precedent to suit and provisions that shorten the statute of limitations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff sued defendant insurance company on an insurance policy for the death of the insured, Frank Green. The insurance policy contained a conditio…
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This was an action at law upon an insurance policy wherein the defendant filed a plea in abatement reading as follows:
“The above named defendant, by its undersigned attorney, prays judgment of the writ and declaration herein, and that the same may be quashed, because it says that among the conditions' and privileges of the policy of insurance herein sued upon and attached to plaintiff’s declaration, it is covenanted and agreed by and between plaintiff and the insured herein, Frank Green, that, ‘No suit or action at law, or in equity, shall be maintainable to enforce the performance of this contract until sixty days shall have expired after filing in the principal office of the company (defendant herein) of the proof of death’; that plaintiff filed proof of the death of said! insured on the 25th day of May! A. D. 1931; that thereafter on the 16th day of July,' A. D. 1931, said plaintiff began this' suit at law on said policy by filing praecipe for summons ad respondendum, contrary to the provisions of said policy; and this the, defendant is ready to verify; wherefore defendant prays judgment of the said writ and declaration, and that the same may be quashed.”
Upon motion of the plaintiff below the plea in abatement was' stricken, which ruling forms one of the assignments of error required,- to be considered on this appeal.
Section 4651 C. G. L., 2931 R. G. S., reads as follows:
*169“All provisions and stipulations contained in any contract whatever entered into after May 26, 1913; fixing the period of time in which suits, may be instituted under any such contract, or upon any matter growing out of the: provisions of any such contract, at a period of time less than that provided by the statute of limitations of this State, are hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy of this State, and to be illegal and void. No court in this State shall give effect to any provision or stipulation of the character mentioned in this section. Ch. 6465, Acts' May 26, 1913, Secs. 1, 2.”
The record shows' that the motion to strike the plea above mentioned was granted by the Circuit Judge on the ground that the' restriction in the contract as to the time that suit might be brought thereon, which was made the basis of the plea in abatement, was clearly in violation of said Section 4651 C. G. L., supra.
The conclusion of a majority of the Court is that the court erred in striking the plea in abatement and that while it might be true as suggested by the defendant in error, that the insurer had waived its rights to invoke the matters set up in the plea because it had denied liability under the policy, yet this is a matter which should be made to appear by appropriate replication.
Section 4651 C. G. L., 2931 R. G. S., has no reference to thos'e provisions of contracts which restrict the right to institute suit until after certain conditions precedent, such as filing proofs and the like, are complied with. In cases falling within the purview of such clauses in a contract no action is maintainable until after the conditions of the contract have been met or unles’s it be alleged and proved that the condition has been waived. Such provision does not tend to shorten the statute of limitations because the statute *170of limitations does not begin to run until the right to maintain a suit has accrued. Therefore such a provision in a contract would not be violative of Section 4651 C. G. L., supra, which merely renders void all provisions and stipulations contained in any contract fixing the period of time in which suit may be instituted under such contract at a period of time less' than that provided by the statute of limitations of this State. See National Surety Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446, 77 Sou. Rep. 212.
Reversed and remanded for appropriate proceedings.
Davis, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
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Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Levine & P'rs, P.A., 848 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…y provision in a contract fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”). See Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 111 Fla. 167, 149 So. 16 (1933); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 115 Fla. 365, 156 So. 109 (1933); Lyons v. National Surety Co., 243 Mo. 607, 147 S.W. 778 (1912); 11 Couch on Insurance 3d § 160:94 (2003); 35 Fla. Jur.2d Limitations and Laches § 10 (2003). For…
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Algerine Williams v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)…appellee had no intention of furthering its investigation during that period nothing would have been accomplished by waiting and that the sixty day waiting period was therefore waived, citing Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Nixon, 1933, 111 Fla. 167, 149 [*146] So. 16; American National Insurance Co. v. de Cardenas, Fla.App. 3rd 1968, 181 So. 2d 359 and Couch on Insurance, 2d, § 75:49. Appellant’s contention appears more plausible to us. The purpose of the sixty day waiting period provided in…
Authorities Cited
- Nat'l Sur. Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446 (Fla. 1917)