FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
LEVINE & PARTNERS, P.A., A FLORIDA PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Fireman's Fund appeals a summary judgment in favor of Levine & Partners on an employee dishonesty insurance claim. The insured law firm sought coverage for embezzlement by its bookkeeper under an endorsement with a 90-day discovery requirement after the coverage period ended. The court reversed, holding that the claim was barred because the embezzlement was discovered 28 months after the coverage period ended, well beyond the 90-day discovery window.
The court held that the claim is barred under the plain and unambiguous terms of the endorsement's discovery clause. Insurance policies must be enforced according to their unambiguous terms, and no public policy exception applies to fidelity policy discovery clauses. The discovery requirement does not violate the statute of limitations because it defines the scope of coverage rather than shortening the time to sue.
[1] An insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with its unambiguous terms.
[2] A provision in an insurance endorsement requiring discovery of loss within a specified period after the coverage period ends is enforceable.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We will pay only for covered loss discovered within 90 days after the end of the coverage period or cancellation date of this insurance.”
The dispositive provision of the endorsement that barred the claim because discovery occurred 28 months after the coverage period ended.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLevine & Partners, a Miami-Dade County law firm, held an Employee Dishonesty Optional Coverage endorsement covering up to $50,000 for losses caused by…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Public Policy In Contract Law cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The defendant carrier appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff insured, a Miami-Dade county law firm, in an action on an Employee Dishonesty Optional Coverage endorsement to a comprehensive policy of insurance issued to the firm. The endorsement provided coverage for up to $50,000 in losses caused by defalcations of key employees, including its longtime and long trusted bookkeeper, a Ms. Stewart. It is undisputed that Ms. Stewart embezzled a great deal of money from the firm during the late 1990’s. It is also undisputed, however, both that the coverage period of the endorsement ended on June 30, 1999 and that Ms. Stewart’s dishonesty was not discovered by the firm until October 2001. Because the claim in question was therefore indisputably barred under the provision of the endorsement that We will pay only for covered loss discovered within 90 days after the end of the coverage period or cancellation date of this insurance.
we reverse the judgment below.
No more need be said or cited in support of this conclusion than the familiar rule that, in common with all contracts, an insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with its unambiguous terms, Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 732 (Fla.2002); Deni Associates of Florida, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla.1998); State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
Moreover, no possible “exception” to this abiding principle applies here. First, contrary to the trial judge’s view, there is nothing contrary to any known “public policy” in the controlling provision, which is common to fidelity policies of this kind. Southeast Bakery Feeds, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 974 S.W. 2d 635 (Mo.App. E.D.1998); First Sec. Bank & Trust v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 232 Neb. 493, 441 N.W. 2d 188 (1989); Dunbar v. National Sur. Corp., 140 Neb. 833, 2 N.W. 2d 116 (1942); see Story v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 439, 156 So. 101, 102 (1934)(“public policy ... [is] a very unruly horse, and, when once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry you”).
Second, because the terms of an endorsement such as the one sued upon control over anything purportedly to the contrary in any other insuring agreement, Steuart Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 696 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), review dismissed, 701 So. 2d 867 (1997); Johnson v. Center Mut. Ins. Co., 529 N.W. 2d 568 (N.D.1995); A & S Fuel Oil Co., Inc. v. Royal Indemnity Co., Inc., 279 N.J.Super. 367, 652 A. 2d 1236 (1995), cert. denied, 141 N.J. 98, 660 A. 2d 1196 (1995); Zurich Ins. Co. v. Bouler, 198 So. 2d 129 (La.App. 1 Cir.1967); 2 Couch on Insurance 3d § 21:22 (2003), it is irrelevant that the “discovery” clause may be contrary to the liability portions of the policy to which the endorsement was attached.1 Compare Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1973)(conflict with same insuring agreement must be resolved in favor of insured); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Burak, 373 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)(same).
Finally, the clause has no effect on the applicable statute of limitations for bringing suit on the policy and therefore is not barred by section 95.03, Florida Statutes (2001)(“Any provision in a contract fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”). See Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 111 Fla. 167, 149 So. 16 (1933); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 115 Fla. 365, 156 So. 109 (1933); Lyons v. National Surety Co., 243 Mo. 607, 147 S.W. 778 (1912); 11 Couch on Insurance 3d § 160:94 (2003); 35 Fla. Jur.2d Limitations and Laches § 10 (2003).
For these reasons, the summary judgment is reversed with directions to enter one for the carrier. Reversed.
. Indeed, the insured's attempts to develop some analogy or conflict between the terms of this fidelity policy and the "occurrence” or "claims made” provisions of a liability policy, see Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla.1983), are so strained that the usual apples and oranges metaphor is insufficient. Comparing daisies and whales would be more like it.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fam. Care Ctr., P.A. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 875 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…d v. S. Fla. Emergency Physicians, 436 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Even if there were an ambiguity between the endorsement and the body of the policy, the endorsement, which is clear, controls. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Levine & Partners, P.A, 848 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Steuart Petroleum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 696 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Accordingly, Family Care is not an insured for this claim under the policy. The estoppel argument, which we now address, was no…
-
Aerothrust Corp. & Sunshine Hoist & Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Granada Ins. Co., 904 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)…ions exclusion of the insurance contract, we affirm the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Granada, which found that Granada had no duty to defend or indemnify Sunshine. See Fireman’s Fund. Ins. Co. v. Levine & Partners, P.A., 848 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that “an insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with its unambiguous terms”). Affirmed.…
-
Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hradecky, 208 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…P.A. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 875 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“Even if there were an ambiguity between the endorsement and the body of the policy, the endorsement, which is clear, controls.”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Levine & Partners, P.A., 848 So. 2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (finding that “the terms of an endorsement such as the one sued upon control over anything purportedly to the contrary in any other insuring agreement”); Steuart Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Deni Assocs. OF Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998)
- Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 2002)
- Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 115 Fla. 436 (Fla. 1934)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Castillo, 829 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983)
- Felton Emory Johns, Sr. v. Senn, 696 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- The Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 115 Fla. 365 (Fla. 1933)
- Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 276 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1973)
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Burak, 373 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 111 Fla. 167 (Fla. 1933)