STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ERIC PECK, APPELLANTS,
v.
AUSTIN OUTDOOR INC. AND ONESOURCE LANDSCAPE & GOLF SERVICES, INC., APPELLEES
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State Farm and Eric Peck appealed a summary judgment granted in favor of Austin Outdoor and OneSource Landscape in a motor vehicle injury case. The core issue was whether the vehicle's driver had the defendants' knowledge and consent or was a thief, which would determine liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The appellate court reversed, finding material disputes of fact precluding summary judgment.
The court held that defendants did not conclusively demonstrate the nonexistence of a factual dispute as to whether the driver was operating the vehicle with the defendants' express or implied knowledge and consent. Summary judgment was therefore improper.
[1] Summary judgment is inappropriate when the moving party fails to conclusively prove the nonexistence of a material fact.
[2] An owner of a vehicle driven by another must conclusively show there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding ownership or consent to the driver's use.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The owner of a vehicle driven by another is 'required to conclusively show that there were no genuine issues of material facts with regard to their ownership of the [vehicle] or their consent to [Driver's] use of it.'”
Establishes the legal standard for vehicle owner liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the burden of proof required to obtain summary judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA truck bearing OneSource Landscaping markings and phone number was involved in an accident. The plaintiff testified the two occupants were of Haitian…
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FARMER, J.
In this motor vehicle, personal injury case, there was a dispute as to whether the driver was operating the defendants’ vehicle with their knowledge and consent, or was instead a thief. If the latter, defendants would not be liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment on this issue filed by defendants. We reverse.
The record evidence emerging during discovery showed that the truck involved in the accident bore a legend saying “OneSource Landscaping Golf’ and beneath it a phone number, “1-877-1-Source.” Plaintiff testified that the two men in the truck were of Haitian descent, spoke Creole to one another at the scene, and wore the same forest green uniforms. He also swore that at the scene he obtained the above vehicle information and the tag number. Defendants concededly owned the vehicle and have employees of Haitian descent who speak Creole and wear uniforms similar to those described at the scene.
Defendants filed affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment. The affidavits swore that they have never had any employee bearing the name given by the driver,1 that to the best of their knowledge no one connected with the corporations ever gave the driver permission to drive its vehicle, and that no one connected with the defendants had any knowledge that this vehicle was involved in an accident on the day in question.
“The moving party has the burden to conclusively prove the nonexistence of a material fact. However, once this burden is met, it then shifts to the non-moving party.” Partridge v. Partridge, 790 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) [c.o.]. The owner of a vehicle driven by another is “required to conclusively show that there were no genuine issues of material facts with regard to their ownership of the [vehicle] or their consent to [Driver’s] use of it.” Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So. 2d 621, 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). “Circumstantial evidence [is] appropriate to prove that [an owner] knew of or consented to the use of his [vehicle by another].” Bradley v. High, 464 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also Singer v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“A jury may infer the existence of an agency even when both the principal and the agent deny it.”[c.o.]).
An appellate court must examine the record and any supporting evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lauderhill v. Rhames, 864 So. 2d 432, 434 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Upon an examination of the record we do not agree that defendants conclusively demonstrated the nonexistence of a factual dispute as to whether the driver was operating defendants’ vehicle with their express or imphed knowledge and consent.
Reversed.
KLEIN, J., and MILLER, KAREN M., Associate Judge, concur. . Plaintiff had been unable to find and serve the driver by the time of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Theresa Singer Ad Litem for Ann Doe v. Star, 510 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- City OF Lauderhill v. Rhames, 864 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Nelms v. State, 790 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- Efrain Medina v. Yoder Auto Sales, Inc., 743 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Cooper v. State, 464 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Se. Volusia Hosp. Dist. v. Dep't OF Ins. & Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund, 464 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)