TIRA TATUM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Tira Tatum appeals enhanced sentences imposed under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender statute, arguing his prior incarceration in a youthful offender boot camp should not qualify him for enhancement. The court holds that the plain language of the statute applies to anyone released from any Department of Corrections facility, including boot camps, and therefore affirms the enhanced sentences.
A youthful offender who has been released from a Department of Corrections boot camp qualifies as a prison releasee reoffender under the statute. The statute's plain language makes no distinction between youthful offender commitments and adult commitments, and therefore applies to boot camp releases. The trial court was required to impose the enhanced sentences.
[1] A "prison releasee reoffender" is a person who commits a qualifying offense within three years after being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Dep…
[2] The plain meaning of a statute must be applied when its language is clear and unambiguous.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By the terms of the statute, a youthful offender who has been released from a Department of Corrections boot camp qualifies for an enhanced sentence.”
Establishes the court's holding on the plain meaning of the statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTatum was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. He had previously been incarcerated in a youthful offender boot camp operated by the De…
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PADOVANO, J.
Tira Tatum, the defendant, appeals the enhanced sentences he received under the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute for the crimes of burglary of a dwelling and grand theft. He contends that his previous incarceration in youthful offender boot camp did not qualify him as a prison releasee reoffender. Because the statute makes no distinction between youthful offender commitments and adult commitments, we conclude that it applies in the defendant’s case, and that the trial court was required to impose the enhanced sentences. For this reason, we affirm.
The statute at issue defines a “prison releasee reoffender” as a person who commits a qualifying offense within three years after being released “from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections.” § 775.082(9) Fla. Stat. (2004). It may be true, as the defendant argues, that the Legislature did not mean to include a prior release from youthful offender commitment as a predicate for an enhanced sentence, but there is nothing in the text of the statute to bear that argument out. By the terms of the statute, a youthful offender who has been released from a Department of Corrections boot camp qualifies for an enhanced sentence.
We are bound by the well-established rule that the courts must look first to the plain meaning of a statute in determining how it should be applied. See Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1996). As the supreme court explained in Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157 (1981)), “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” The statute in question here is not ambiguous. It applies to a person who has been released from any correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections.
The defendant argues that the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute was designed for offenders who have been recently released from prison and that it would be contrary to the goals of the Youthful Offender statute to apply it to those who have been released from rehabilitation programs like boot camps. That may be a valid argument, but it is not one we are at liberty to address here. Whether it is a good policy to-subject a defendant with a previous youthful offender commitment to the mandatory maximum sentencing provisions of the Prison Releasee Reoffender statute is a question for the Legislature.
Affirmed.
KAHN, C.J., and BROWNING, J„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Graham v. State, 974 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…that Graham had the right to the presence of an attorney and did not include any time-frame limitation. We therefore affirm on this point without further comment. With regard to Graham’s enhanced sentence, we adopt the reasoning of Tatum v. State, 922 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), in which the First District concluded that “[bjecause the statute makes no distinction between youthful offender commitments and adult commit- [*441] merits, ... the trial court was required to impose the enhanced sentence…
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Singleton v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…Corrections.” § 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (2016). Nothing in the text of the statute indicates that a defendant’s age at the time of his prior conviction and sentence is relevant to the application of section 775.082(9). See, e.g., Tatum v. State, 922 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding that enhancing defendant’s sentence under section 775.082(9) based on prior commitment and release from a “youthful offender boot camp” was proper because the prison releasee reoffender statute makes no distinction b…
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McDuffey v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…iolates either Graham or Miller when the prior offense considered by the trial court occurred when the defendant was a juvenile. 2 III. 2 We reject the State’s contention that Graham v. State, 974 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) and Tatum v. State, 922 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), apply here. First, both cases concerned the use of a prior conviction where the defendant received youthful offender sanctions to qualify for PRR sentence enhancement. Graham, 974 So. 2d at 440-41; Tatum, 922 So. 2d at 1005-06.…
Authorities Cited
- Eugene Holly, M.D. v. Albert W. Auld, M.D., 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984)
- A. R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Abbey v. Abbey, 102 Fla. 1141 (Fla. 1931)
- Moonlit Waters Apts., Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1996)