ELIZABETH K. WADE, CHAIRPERSON, AND THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED MEMBERS OF THE CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY AND THE CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, APPELLANTS,
v.
MICHAEL D. BROWN, MAYOR, CITY OF RIVIERA BEACH, APPELLEE
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The court held that a temporary injunction was improperly granted because the record failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.
[1] A temporary injunction requires a showing of irreparable harm, lack of an adequate remedy at law, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and that the injuncti…
[2] A trial court must make clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings to support each of the four criteria for granting a temporary injunction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA Mayor sought a declaratory judgment and temporary injunction to speak from the dais at CRA meetings, not just the podium. The trial court granted th…
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PER CURIAM.
In 1992, the City Council for Riviera Beach declared itself a Community Redevelopment Agency (“CRA”) under the Community Redevelopment Act of 1969.1 When the CRA’s Board informed Michael Brown, the Mayor of Riviera Beach, that he could speak at CRA meetings only from the podium, he sought (1) a declaratory judgment stating that, as a member of Riviera Beach’s governing body, he was entitled to speak from the dais, and (2) a temporary injunction preventing the CRA from prohibiting him from speaking from the dais. Reserving consideration of the merits of the petition for declaratory judgment to a later day, the trial court granted the Mayor’s request for an injunction. We reverse the temporary injunction order because the record fails to demonstrate irreparable harm.
This court has held that “[a] temporary injunction may be granted if the complainant shows ‘(1) that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.’ ” Colucci v. Kar Kare Auto. Group, Inc., 918 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla.4th DCA 2006) (quoting Net First Nat’l Bank v.
First Telebanc Corp., 834 So. 2d 944, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). “ ‘Clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings’ must support each of these four criteria before the court may enter the injunction.” Aerospace Welding, Inc. v. Southstream Exhaust & Welding, Inc., 824 So. 2d 226, 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (referencing City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co., 634 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), approved, 659 So. 2d 1046 (Fla.1995)). “ ‘To the extent it rests on purely legal matters, an order imposing an injunction is subject to full, or de novo, review on appeal.’ ” Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 827 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla.2002) (quoting Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 670 (Fla.1993)).
In granting the temporary injunction, the trial court opined that the Mayor and the citizens would be irreparably harmed if the Mayor could not participate in discussions. There was, however, no evidence to support a finding that the Mayor could not participate in discussions. In fact, the Mayor acknowledged he had the option of participating in discussions, albeit from the podium, and there was no evidence showing that the CRA would in any way restrict the Mayor’s discussions. Rather, the Mayor simply refused to speak from the podium.
The trial court’s order not only failed to acknowledge the Mayor’s ability to speak from the podium, but, more importantly, failed to establish how permitting him to speak only from the podium would cause irreparable harm. An injunction prior to final judgment is a drastic and extraordinary remedy; a trial court reversibly errs when an order fails to make specific findings for each of the elements. See Milin v. Nw. Fla. Land, L.C., 870 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (calling an order granting a temporary injunction “defective” when it “failed to set forth any factual findings in support of the four criteria”).
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the temporary injunction and need not reach the other issues on appeal.
Reversed.
STEVENSON, C.J., GUNTHER and MAY, JJ., concur. . See § 163.330, Fla. Stal. As an alternative to appointing independent members to make up the CRA, the “governing body” may declare itself to be the CRA. See § 163.357, Fla. Stat.
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McKEEGAN v. Ernst, 84 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ly sufficient factual findings’ supporting each of the required elements before entering an injunction.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] trial court reversibly errs when an order fails to make specific findings for each of the elements.” Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citation omitted). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) provides that “[e]very injunction shall specify the reasons for entry....” The order granting the temporary injunction herein does not make sufficient factual fin…
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Dubner v. Ferraro, 242 So. 3d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)…e persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction. We have often recognized that “a trial court reversibly errs when an order fails to make specific findings for each of the elements.” Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). “Strict compliance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) . . . is required.” Eldon v. Perrin, 78 So. 3d 737, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). And, a bond is ordinarily required for a temporary mandatory injunction absen…
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City OF Miami v. Santos, 315 So. 3d 115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)…etitioner outweighs any possible harm to the respondent; and, (4) the entry of the injunction will not disserve the public interest.”). Finally, the order lacks the required findings of facts and statement of legal reasons. See, e.g., Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“Clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of these four criteria before the court may enter the injunction.”) (Citations and quotations omitted). We have considered the other argumen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- City OF Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993)
- Smith v. Coal. TO Reduce Class Size & Pre-K Comm., 827 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2002)
- Colucci v. EAR Rare Auto. Grp., Inc., 918 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Jacksonville, 659 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 1995)
- NET First Nat'l Bank v. First Telebanc Corp., 834 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Aerospace Welding, Inc. v. Southstream Exhaust & Welding, Inc., 824 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Jackson v. State, 870 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)