RITA MCKEEGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
MARGARET P. ERNST, AS BENEFICIARY AND SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE UNDER THE ANNA MARIE CREGG REVOCABLE TRUST; LAURIE ANN LINEBERRY N/K/A LAURIE ANN MCCARTHY, AS BENEFICIARY UNDER THE ANNA MARIE CREGG REVOCABLE TRUST, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 2012-04-11
No. 4D11-3883
POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
84 So. 3d 1229 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2012) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Rita McKeegan appealed an ex parte temporary injunction granted against her by the trial court. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the injunction facially deficient because it lacked sufficient factual findings supporting each prong of the four-part injunction test and violated McKeegan's due process rights by failing to comply with procedural requirements for ex parte relief.


Holding

The court held that the injunction order was reversibly erroneous because it failed to make specific, clear, and definite factual findings supporting each of the four required elements for temporary injunctive relief, and because it violated procedural requirements by failing to document efforts to provide notice and failing to state reasons why notice was not given.


Headnotes

[1] A temporary injunction requires a showing of the likelihood of irreparable harm, the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, a substantial likelihood of success on t…

[2] An injunction order must specify the reasons for its entry.

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Key Quotes

“A party seeking a temporary injunction must prove: (1) that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.”

Establishes the four-part test required for granting a temporary injunction

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court granted an ex parte temporary injunction in favor of appellees Margaret P. Ernst and Laurie Ann McCarthy, who were beneficiaries under…

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Opinion of the Court
HAZOURI, J.

HAZOURI, J.

Appellant, Rita McKeegan, appeals the trial court’s entry of an ex parte temporary injunction granted by the trial court. She argues that the temporary injunction is facially deficient because it fails to include sufficient factual findings to support each prong of the four-part injunction test. We agree.

“A party seeking a temporary injunction must prove: (1) that it will suffer irreparable harm unless the status quo is maintained; (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law; (3) that it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (4) that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.” Jouvence Ctr. for Advanced Health, LLC v. Jouvence Rejuvenation Ctrs., LLC, 14 So.3d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted). “The party must also establish that it has a clear legal right to the relief sought. Finally, a trial court must make ‘clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings’ supporting each of the required elements before entering an injunction.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] trial court reversibly errs when an order fails to make specific findings for each of the elements.” Wade v. Brown, 928 So.2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citation omitted). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) provides that “[e]very injunction shall specify the reasons for entry....” The order granting the temporary injunction herein does not make sufficient factual findings which support each of the elements. On remand, the trial court must make specific findings showing that appellees are entitled to relief.

Additionally, appellant argues and we agree that her due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard were violated because appellees did not meet their heavy burden to establish that notice was not required.

The ex parte temporary injunction failed to meet the requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(a). Appellees’ attorney did not certify in writing any efforts made to give notice or any reasons why notice should not be required. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)(B). Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass’n., Inc. v. Benitez, 748 So.2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (attorney did not certify in writing any efforts made to give notice and notice by facsimile only one hour before injunction was granted was insufficient). Rule 1.610(a)(2) also requires the court to “give the reasons why the order was granted without notice if notice was not given,” which the trial court did not do. See Bookall v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 995 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (order failing to explicitly state rea*1231sons why the order was granted without notice requires reversal even though mov-ant met its burden of establishing the elements for entry of an injunction). For these additional reasons we reverse the order granting the ex parte temporary injunction.

Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Am. Learning Sys., Inc. v. Breno Gomes and Adriana Gomes, 199 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
    …t a temporary injunction will serve the public interest.” Id. (emphasis added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A trial court reversibly errs when an order fails to make specific findings for each of the elements.” McKeegan v. Ernst, 84 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation and internal brackets omitted). Here, neither the circuit court’s oral ruling nor its written order contains “clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings.” Eldon, 78 So. 3d at 738 (citation omi…
  • Dubner v. Ferraro, 242 So. 3d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
    …v. Quality Health Plans, Inc., 51 So. 3d 1191, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Foreclosure FreeSearch, Inc. v. Sullivan, 12 So. 3d 771, 775 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). The movant must also show a clear legal right to the injunction. McKeegan v. Ernst, 84 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) governing injunctions provides: Every injunction shall specify the reasons for entry, shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained without 2 The Broward Circuit…
  • Hayes v. Monroe Cnty., 337 So. 3d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
    …ess and equal protection of the law, every final 7 order entered by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions must contain specific findings of fact upon which its ultimate action is taken.”); McKeegan v. Ernste, 84 So. 3d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (finding order devoid of rule-based requirement to render factual findings facially deficient). And here, the magistrate did not. The circuit court, however, veered away from this patent deficiency and summarily dete…

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