LADELL M. PLEASURE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ladell Pleasure appealed the trial court's summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The court reversed, holding that Rule 3.800 permits successive motions and that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard by denying the motion solely on grounds of successiveness.
The court held that Rule 3.800(a) expressly permits successive motions because the rule allows courts to correct illegal sentences 'at any time' and contains no provision barring successive motions. Instead of applying a successiveness bar, the proper standard for evaluating successive Rule 3.800(a) motions is whether the current motion is barred by collateral estoppel—which requires showing that the identical issue was previously litigated between the same parties and decided on the merits.
[1] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) permits successive motions to correct an illegal sentence.
[2] A successive motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) is not barred by successiveness, but may be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rule 3.800 ... allows a court to correct an illegal sentence 'at any time.' Florida courts have held, and we agree, that the phrase 'at any time' allows defendants to file successive motions under rule 3.800.”
Establishes that Rule 3.800(a) permits successive motions based on the plain language of the rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePleasure filed a motion under Rule 3.800(a) to correct an allegedly illegal sentence. The trial court denied the motion, stating it was successive bec…
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COPE, C.J.
This is an appeal of an order summarily denying a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse.
Ladell M. Pleasure filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The trial court denied the motion for successiveness. The court stated, in part, “The motion is successive pursuant to [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure] 3.800 in that the defendant has previously filed a 3.800 pleading (denied ... in 2004). The current grounds alleged are similar to those previously raised and were available to allege in the previously filed motion.”
In so saying, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, Rule 3.800 allows successive motions. “Rule 3.800 ... allows a court to correct an illegal sentence ‘at any time.’ Florida courts have held, and we agree, that the phrase ‘at any time’ allows defendants to file successive motions under rule 3.800.” State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted). That is so because the text of Rule 3.800(a) does not contain any provision barring successive motions.1 Thus the trial court was incorrect in applying a successiveness bar to the defendant’s motion.
Instead, in the case óf a second or subsequent Rule 3.800(a) motion, the question is whether the subsequent motion is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel applies when “the identical issue has been litigated between the same parties or their privies.” State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d at 290-91 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For the bar of collateral estoppel to apply, the prior decision must have been on the merits. See id,.
Thus on remand, the questions for the trial court are whether the defendant’s current Rule 3.800(a) motion raises the identical issue as the previous motion, and whether the previous motion was decided on the merits. If that turns out to be so, then the trial court’s order denying the current Rule 3.800(a) motion should include as attachments the prior order denying relief plus the defendant’s prior Rule 3.800(a) motion. Only by including those attachments will the record conclusively show that the defendant’s current motion is barred by collateral estoppel. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(D) (“On appeal from the denial of relief, unless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief.”).
Alternatively, if a review of the prior motion, order, and related documents shows that the current claim is not identical to the claim previously decided, then the trial court will need to proceed to a consideration of the merits of the current Rule 3.800(a) motion.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
. By contrast, Rule 3.850 contains a specific provision which bars certain successive 3.850 motions. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(f).
. If there was a prior decision on the merits and an affirmance on appeal, then the law of the case doctrine would also come into play. See id. at 289-90; Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140, 143-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), rev. denied, No. SC05-2071, 929 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. April 10, 2006).
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Citator
Cited By (16 total)
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Orin A. Mims v. State, 994 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ourts, including the Florida Supreme Court, have held that the phrase “at any time” allows defendants to file successive motions under Rule 3.800. Id. Only a previously adjudicated Rule 3.800 claim may not be raised a second time. Pleasure v. State, 931 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). It is clear in this case that no motion filed by this defendant sought to raise a previously adjudicated ground, as claimed by the trial court. Recognizing the trial court fatally misread the substance of the motions, the…1 / 2
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Holton v. State, 51 So. 3d 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…. 1st DCA 2004) (“[T]he trial court erred in denying the appellant’s claim as being barred by collateral estoppel as it is not clear from the record before this Court that the instant claims have ever been decided on the merits”); Pleasure v. State, 931 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“For the bar of collateral estoppel to apply, the prior decision must have been on the merits.”). Thus, collateral estoppel does not bar the appellant from challenging the scoring of the robbery convictions. Accordingly, w…
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Jimenez v. State, 88 So. 3d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…riminal Procedure 3.800. The trial court’s order denied the motion on the basis that it was successive and untimely. [*195] As the State properly concedes, the claims raised by Jimenez are not barred as successive or untimely. See Pleasure v. State, 931 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding successive motions are permitted under Rule 3.800(a) so long as the identical claim has not previously been adjudicated on the merits); accord Mims v. State, 994 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). See also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Antoine L. McBRIDE, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003)
- Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- State v. Collins, 929 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2006)