BILLY JOE HOLTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2010-12-21
No. 1D10-0712
VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
51 So. 3d 1164 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Billy Joe Holton appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). The trial court improperly included two robbery convictions as "prior record" on his sentencing scoresheet, even though those crimes were committed after his primary offenses. The appellate court reversed and remanded for resentencing with a corrected scoresheet.


Holding

The court held that the two robbery convictions could not be scored as prior convictions because they were committed after the primary offense, regardless of when Holton was convicted and sentenced for them. The court also held that collateral estoppel does not bar review because the scoresheet error claim had never been decided on the merits in previous motions. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing with a correctly calculated scoresheet.


Headnotes

[1] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) allows for successive motions to correct an illegal sentence.

[2] A successive motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a) is not barred by successiveness, but may be barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

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Key Quotes

“after-committed offenses could not be scored on score-sheet for instant crimes”

Establishes the controlling legal principle that crimes committed after the primary offense cannot be included as prior convictions on a sentencing scoresheet

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Facts & Procedural History

On September 15, 1987, Holton was convicted of burglary with assault, aggravated assault, sexual battery, kidnapping, and robbery with a weapon. He wa…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant challenges the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for the appellant to be resentenced according to a correctly calculated scoresheet.

On September 15, 1987, following a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of burglary with assault (count one), aggravated assault (count two), sexual battery (count three), kidnapping (count four), and robbery with a weapon (count five). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for counts one, four and five, five years’ imprisonment for count two, and 30 years’ imprisonment for count three.

*1165The appellant asserts that his scoresheet erroneously included two convictions for robbery as “prior record” convictions where those crimes took place after the instant offenses. The record indicates that the two “prior” robberies occurred after the primary offense was committed, even though the appellant was sentenced for those crimes before the instant convictions. Thus, those crimes were not prior convictions and were improperly included on the appellant’s sentencing scoresheet. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.701(d)(5); Schummer v. State, 657 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (after-committed offenses could not be scored on score-sheet for instant crimes); Laster v. State, 486 So.2d 88, 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that the points assessed for a prior offense should not have been added to the scoresheet because that crime was committed after the primary offense and thus is not a prior offense even though the appellant had been convicted and sentenced for the prior before the instant conviction and sentences). The state concedes that the inclusion of the robbery convictions on the scoresheet is improper. The error renders the appellant’s sentence illegal. Absent the 318 points erroneously scored for the two robbery convictions, the life sentences would have been upward departure sentences. Because it appears the appellant’s sentences could not have been imposed, absent a departure, the appellant is entitled to relief.1 See Goings v. State, 990 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that because a sentence could not have been imposed absent a departure, a defendant who filed a 3.800(a) motion alleging scoresheet error is entitled to relief).

The trial court denied the appellant’s claim as successive. While rule 3.800(a) does not prohibit successive motions, a defendant is not entitled to successive review of a specific issue that has already been decided on the merits. See State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003); Fuston v. State, 764 So.2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Although the appellant has raised this claim in previous postcon-viction motions, the claim has never been addressed on the merits. See Williams v. State, 868 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“[T]he trial court erred in denying the appellant’s claim as being barred by collateral estoppel as it is not clear from the record before this Court that the instant claims have ever been decided on the merits”); Pleasure v. State, 931 So.2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“For the bar of collateral estoppel to apply, the prior decision must have been on the merits.”). Thus, collateral estoppel does not bar the appellant from challenging the scoring of the robbery convictions.

Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for the trial court to resentence the appellant pursuant to a correctly calculated scoresheet.

VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Hosea T. Blackwell v. State, 65 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …topped from bringing a successive rule 3.800(a) claim only where it has been raised previously and decided on the merits. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003); Fuston v. State, 764 So. 2d 779, 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Holton v. State, 51 So. 3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA [*1213] 2010). And while it is true that Blackwell raised the claim in his June 2009 rule 3.800(a) motion, the postconviction court in the 2009 proceedings did not deny the claim on the merits but as successive. Consequently, the…
  • McMANUS v. State, 177 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
    …merit, but concluded the motion is barred by collateral estoppel and the law of the case doctrine. Collateral estoppel may bar a successive rule 3.800(a) motion where the “specific issue ... has already been decided on the merits.” Holton v. State, 51 So. 3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 290-91 (Fla.2003)). Similarly, the law of the case doctrine may bar relitigation of an issue that was actually decided in a previous appeal. See Swain v. State, 911 So. 2d 140, 143…
  • Mims v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
    …ed. Appellant’s claim is barred by collateral estoppel. “While rule 3.800(a) does not prohibit successive motions, a defendant is not entitled to successive review of a specific issue that has already been decided on the merits.” Holton v. State, 51 So. 3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003)). Appellant previously raised this claim and substantially similar claims in prior motions, which were denied on the merits. Thus, the claim is barred by collateral…

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