VINCENT RUOTOLO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant's motion for jail credit under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a) was reversed because a notation stating "defendant agrees to time served" does not conclusively establish that he waived his claim for additional jail days, and the trial court must resolve the patent conflict on remand.
A notation stating "defendant agrees to time served" does not conclusively demonstrate that a defendant waived his entitlement to additional jail credit and must be resolved by the trial court.
[1] A disposition sheet notation that "defendant agrees to time served" does not conclusively establish waiver of a jail credit claim and does not preclude the trial court fr…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"Defendant agrees to time served" may reasonably convey that defendant has agreed only to a time served sentence, not that he agreed that 280 days is the correct number of days.”
Court's explanation of why the disposition sheet notation does not conclusively establish waiver of jail credit claim.
Appellant claimed entitlement to 193 additional days of jail credit beyond the 280 days credited at sentencing in August 2005, specifying two periods …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant filed a motion for jail credit under rule 3.800(a), claiming an entitlement to an additional 193 days. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(a). The motion specifies dates for two periods of time he spent in jail before his August 2005 sentencing. He claimed that he is entitled to 338 days after his initial arrest before being released on bond. He then claims an additional 135 days after being re-arrested before his sentencing. The trial court gave him credit at sentencing for only 280 days.
His rule 3.800(a) motion was denied because a notation on the disposition sheet stated, “defendant agrees to time served.” We hold that this document fails to show conclusively that he was not entitled to the days claimed in his motion. “Defendant agrees to time served” may reasonably convey that defendant has agreed only to a time served sentence, not that he agreed that 280 days is the correct number of days. The trial court shall resolve this patent conflict. As in Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345, 345-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), our reversal does not preclude the trial court from ultimately denying relief on remand if it finds that he voluntarily and specifically waived the jail credit now being claimed.
Reversed.
POLEN, FARMER and MAY, JJ„ concur.