ANTHONY L. ROBINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2002-10-01
No. 4D02-3005
GUNTHER, KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
827 So. 2d 345 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2002) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Anthony Robinson appealed the denial of his motion for jail credit in two probation violation cases. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that Robinson is entitled to credit for time spent in jail before and after sentencing unless he voluntarily and specifically waived such credit, which the record did not clearly demonstrate.


Holding

Robinson is entitled to jail credit for all time spent in jail prior to being sentenced and after being sentenced on the underlying charges, and for all time spent in jail as a condition of probation, unless he voluntarily and specifically waived such credit. The record before the court did not clearly demonstrate such a waiver, so relief could not be denied on that basis.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for all time spent in jail prior to sentencing on the original charges and for time spent in jail after sentencing on the original charg…

[2] A defendant may waive the right to jail credit, but such waiver must be voluntary and specific.

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Key Quotes

“Appellant is entitled to such credit. See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); Ivey v. State, 327 So.2d 219 (Fla.1976); Whitehead v. State, 677 So.2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sharp v. State, 303 So.2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).”

Establishes the statutory and common law right to jail credit for time spent incarcerated before and after sentencing.

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Facts & Procedural History

Robinson filed a motion for jail credit under Rule 3.800(a) in two cases involving probation violations, claiming he was not given credit for time spe…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Anthony Robinson, challenges the order denying his motion for jail credit, filed pursuant to Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We reverse and remand.

Appellant alleged that in two case numbers involving violations of probation he was not given credit for all the time he spent in jail prior to sentencing on the original charges and for time spent in jail after sentencing on the original charges. Appellant is entitled to such credit. See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); Ivey v. State, 327 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1976); Whitehead v. State, 677 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sharp v. State, 303 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

We note that the transcript of the plea colloquy filed by appellant in this Court indicates the possibility that there may have been a plea agreement calling for a waiver of such credit. If appellant voluntarily and specifically waived the jail credit, he would not be entitled to relief. See Henderson v. State, 720 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Silverstein v. State, 654 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). However, the record before this Court does not clearly demonstrate that appellant voluntarily and specifically waived the credit. Additionally, even if we could consider the transcript filed by the appellant, we find that it does not reflect a voluntary and specific waiver by him. Accordingly, we cannot affirm the denial of relief on the basis of waiver. Our reversal does not preclude the trial court from denying relief on remand if any part of the record demonstrates that appellant voluntarily and specifically waived the jail credit. Of course, the trial court should attach to its order any record portions refuting the claim. If the record does not refute appellant’s claim, the trial court shall award him credit for all time spent in jail prior to being sentenced and after being sentenced on the underlying charges, and for all time spent in jail as a condition of probation. Any resentencing shall take place as soon as possible, as appellant alleged that his release date without the jail credit he seeks, is October 31, 2002.

No rehearing will be entertained. The clerk is instructed to issue the mandate simultaneously with this opinion.

GUNTHER, KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Haines v. State, 851 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
    …1, 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). However, in the absence of such a waiver, the failure to award credit results in an illegal sentence. See Beshara v. State, 736 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Such a waiver will not be presumed. See Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Reed v. State, 810 So. 2d 1025, 1026-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Wells v. State, 751 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, the trial court may either award additional jail and prison cred…
  • Davis v. State, 88 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
    …e or he spent in the county jail before sentence.” In the context of a violation of probation sentence, a defendant is entitled to all time spent in jail prior to being sentenced and after being sentenced on the underlying charge. Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted). A defendant is also entitled to credit for time served in jail for [*1057] the current violation of probation and prior violations of the same probation. Waithe v. State, 941 So. 2d 534, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA…
  • Ruotolo v. State, 933 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …ndant agrees to time served” may reasonably convey that defendant has agreed only to a time served sentence, not that he agreed that 280 days is the correct number of days. The trial court shall resolve this patent conflict. As in Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345, 345-46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), our reversal does not preclude the trial court from ultimately denying relief on remand if it finds that he voluntarily and specifically waived the jail credit now being claimed. Reversed. POLEN, FARMER and MAY, J…

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