KEVIN CHARLES SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kevin Charles Smith challenges his October 2005 probation revocation sentence, arguing that a six-month probation extension in April 2005 exceeded the six-year statutory maximum for youthful offenders, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation. The court reversed the summary denial of his Rule 3.800(a) motion and remanded for reconsideration.
The court held that Smith stated a facially sufficient claim for relief because the probation extension may have violated the six-year limitation of the Youthful Offender Act, potentially depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to revoke probation when the affidavit was filed in September 2005.
[1] A trial court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when imposing a sentence for a violation of probation to ensure the total time served does not e…
[2] When sentencing a defendant as a youthful offender, a court may not impose a split sentence that exceeds six years in length.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When imposing a sentence for a violation of probation, a court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when necessary to ensure that the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense at issue.”
Establishes the governing rule that total sentence time cannot exceed statutory maximum, including probation time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was sentenced as a youthful offender in July 1999 to four years' incarceration followed by two years' probation (six years total, the statutory …
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct his illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) in which he alleged that the April 2005 extension of his original probation illegally imposed a sanction outside of the Youthful Offender Act and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose the October 2005 sentence upon his subsequent violation of probation. Because the appellant has stated a facially sufficient claim for relief and the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion does not include record attachments refuting his claim, we reverse and remand.
On July 30, 1999, the appellant was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation.
On April 29, 2005, the appellant’s probation was extended by six months due to a technical violation.
On September 22, 2005, an affidavit of violation of probation was filed and the appellant’s probation was revoked on October 24, 2005, resulting in a prison sentence. When imposing a sentence for a violation of probation, a court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when necessary to ensure that the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense at issue. See State v. Summers, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla.1994); Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1995) (holding that upon revocation of probation, a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control, probation, and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum); Bragg v. State, 644 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“[i]f the trial court includes probation as part of a sentence upon revocation of probation, the trial court must give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions ... and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum”).
Furthermore, when sentencing an accused as a youthful offender, a court may not impose a split sentence that exceeds six years in length. See § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1999). The appellant was originally sentenced to a total of six years’ incarceration and probation combined in July of 1999. As such, his six years were completed in July of 2005.
Accordingly, the April 2005 extension of his probation by six months may have been illegal as it lengthened his sentence beyond the six-year limitation imposed by the Youthful Offender Act.
Thus, when the affidavit of violation was filed on September 22, 2005, it would appear that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to revoke the appellant’s probation. See Wilson v. State, 698 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
We accordingly reverse the trial court’s summary denial of the appellant’s motion and remand for the trial court to either vacate the appellant’s sentence imposed on October 24, 2005, as a result of his violation of probation or attach record portions that conclusively refute his claim.
REVERSED.
WEBSTER, POLSTON, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Knite v. State, 102 So. 3d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ol, the defendant is entitled to credit for time previously served on probation because, if the rule were otherwise, the trial court “could extend probation ad infinitum beyond the statutory maximum each time probation was revoked”); Smith v. State, 941 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (holding trial court lacked jurisdiction to address revocation of probation as defendant had already served in excess of the six years permitted by governing youthful offender statute). [*695] Count IV of the underlying info…
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Badger v. State, 23 So. 3d 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…ril 2001 and March 2003. First, we conclude Mr. Badger is entitled to credit because the maximum [*816] lawful sentence that he could receive as a youthful offender was four years’ imprisonment, followed by two years’ probation. See Smith v. State, 941 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[W]hen sentencing an accused as a youthful offender, a court may not impose a split sentence that exceeds six years in length.”). Reluctantly, we conclude that the trial court could not simply disregard the earlier term of…
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Edwards v. State, 59 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’” Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995) (quoting Bragg v. State, 644 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also, Smith v. State, 941 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“When imposing a sentence for a violation of probation, a court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when necessary to ensure that the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum for the o…
Authorities Cited
- Carder v. State, 642 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1994)
- Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995)
- Bragg v. State, 644 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Wilson v. State, 698 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)