CHRISTOPHER L. EDWARDS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Christopher Edwards appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion challenging his conviction. The appellate court affirmed the denial of his claims but remanded for the trial court to correct a patent sentencing illegality by crediting time previously served on probation against his new split sentence to comply with statutory maximum penalties.
The appellate court affirmed the denial of Edwards' post-conviction relief claims but remanded for the trial court to correct the sentencing illegality by granting credit for time previously served on probation to ensure the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum of fifteen years for the underlying robbery offense.
[1] An appellate court may order the correction of patent sentencing errors apparent in the record, even if not raised in a postconviction motion or the order on appeal.
[2] When imposing a new split sentence following a violation of probation, a court must give credit for time previously served on probation if the total sanctions, including…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a trial court imposes a new split sentence following a violation of probation, the law requires that the court 'give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.'”
Establishes the legal standard for crediting prior probation time in split sentences upon probation violations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEdwards was initially sentenced to eight years in prison followed by five years of probation for robbery, a second-degree felony with a fifteen-year s…
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Christopher Edwards appeals from the summary denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, which raised two claims. We affirm, without discussion, as to both claims, but remand with directions that the trial court address a sentencing illegality apparent in the record. See Govea v. State, 785 So.2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (on postconviction appeal, appellate court may order correction of patent sentencing errors not raised in postconviction motion or in order on appeal) (citing Rodriguez v. State, 766 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) and Kinsey v. State, 728 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).
In the proceedings below, the trial court initially sentenced Edwards to eight years in prison followed by five years of probation on a charge of robbery, a second degree felony with a fifteen-year maximum penalty. Edwards has not performed well on probation, and has violated his probation several times. For Edwards’ most recent violation of probation, the trial court imposed a new split sentence of fourteen years in prison (with appropriate credit for prior jail and prison time), to be followed by a new one-year probationary term. When a trial court imposes a new split sentence following a violation of probation, the law requires that the court “‘give credit for any time previously served on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’” Waters v. State, 662 So.2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995) (quoting Bragg v. State, 644 So.2d 586, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)); see also, Smith v. State, 941 So.2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“When imposing a sentence for a violation of probation, a court must provide credit for time previously served on probation when necessary to ensure that the total time served does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense at issue.”) (citations omitted).
*1178In this case, the new split sentence reaches the statutory maximum penalty with no credit for the time that Edwards previously served on probation. It appears from the record before us that Edwards has already served approximately seven months on probation and community control for this offense. If Edwards is not given credit for the time he has already served on probation and community control against the new one-year probationary term, then Edwards will be forced to serve approximately fifteen years and seven months on the charge, as a result of the new split sentence, in violation of Waters.
Accordingly, we affirm as to the issues raised in Edwards’ postconviction motion, but remand with directions that Edwards be given the credit necessary for his new split sentence to comply with Waters.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
PALMER, ORFINGER, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Adams v. State, 207 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…ed on probation if the new period of probation together with other sanctions (including jail and [*253] prison credit) and the time previously served on probation total more than the statutory maximum for the underlying offense.’ ” Edwards v. State, 59 So. 3d 1177, 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (quoting Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995)); see also Chase v. State, 977 So. 2d 708, 709-10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“Upon revocation of probation following completion of community control, the court must credit…
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Jeffers v. State, 106 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)…previously served on probation if the new sentence of probation and incarceration equals the statutory maximum sentence. See Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995); Storey v. State, 684 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Edwards v. State, 59 So. 3d 1177, 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). After revoking Jeffers’ probation, the trial court sentenced him to a split sentence of 115.5 months’ incarceration followed by 64.5 months’ probation, which totals fifteen years-the maximum sentence permissible for a seco…
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Bishop v. State, 62 So. 3d 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…g five years of confinement and supervision, Bishop must be given credit for the time he previously served on probation against the new probationary period imposed to comply with Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla.1995). See Edwards v. State, 59 So. 3d 1177 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). It does not appear from Bishop’s sentencing documents, in the record on appeal, that this credit was awarded. Accordingly, we remand with directions that Bishop be given any probationary credit necessary for his new split senten…
Authorities Cited
- Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995)
- Bragg v. State, 644 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Alvarez Alberto Rodriguez v. State, 766 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Govea v. State, 785 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
- Kinsey v. State, 728 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Smith v. State, 941 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)