MICHAEL A. RATIGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN STONE AND PAUL LABINER, APPELLEES
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the trial court awarded attorneys fees to the former wife as sanctions for the husband's litigation misconduct and also awarded attorneys fees to the former wife's fiancée as sanctions in a related domestic violence injunction proceeding. The appellate court affirmed the sanctions award to the former wife but reversed the award to the fiancée, finding no statutory authority for such an award in the domestic violence context.
The court affirmed the award of attorneys fees to the former wife as sanctions because the former husband engaged in litigation misconduct (lack of forthrightness about finances and failure to comply with discovery), which was properly sanctionable under section 57.105, Florida Statutes. However, the court reversed the award of attorneys fees to Labiner because there was no statutory authority to award attorneys fees as sanctions in the separately-filed domestic violence injunction proceeding.
[1] A trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorneys' fees in dissolution of marriage proceedings, with the primary factor being the parties' financial resources.
[2] A trial court may award attorneys' fees as sanctions for litigation misconduct, including misleading testimony, lack of forthrightness regarding financial affairs, and fa…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A trial judge has broad discretion in awarding attorneys fees to one party or both parties in proceedings for a dissolution of marriage, support, or child custody.”
Establishes the legal standard for attorneys fees awards in dissolution cases, with financial resources as the primary factor.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMichael Ratigan appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The trial court found that Ratigan was not forthright with his financial affairs…
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PER CURIAM.
Michael A. Ratigan, (the former husband), appeals the trial courts amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage, denial of his motion for rehearing, and the trial courts award of attorneys fees to the former wife’s fiancée, Paul Labiner, (La-biner). We affirm the amended final judgment and the denial of the motion for rehearing, but we reverse the attorneys fees award to Labiner. A trial judge has broad discretion in awarding attorneys fees to one party or both parties in proceedings for a dissolution of marriage, support, or child custody. See Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1997). The primary factor a judge considers is the financial resources of the parties. Rosen, 696 So. 2d at 700.
Here, the trial judge reviewed the limited financial information provided. The trial judge determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish entitlement to attorneys fees for either party. Thus, we find that the trial judge properly denied the former husbands request for attorneys fees and affirm the amended final judgment.
In addition, a trial judge has discretion in awarding attorneys fees as sanctions for parties engaging in litigation misconduct. See Levy v. Levy, 862 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)(emphasis added); Binker v. Binker, 781 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). In Levy, this Court upheld an attorneys fees award as sanctions to the former wife after finding the former husband engaged in litigation misconduct by testifying in a misleading fashion, not being forthright with his financial affairs, and failing to abide by the trial courts orders. Levy, 862 So. 2d at 52.
Here, the former husband was not forthright with his financial affairs and failed to comply with discovery requests. The trial judge found that the former husband engaged in wrong-doing throughout the trial. We find that the trial judge was justified in awarding attorneys fees as a sanction to the former wife, pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2002). See 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2002). Thus, we affirm the trial judges denial of the motion for rehearing.
We find, however, that the trial judge erred in awarding attorneys fees to Labiner in the domestic violence injunction proceeding. Although we understand the trial courts frustration and outrage, there was no statutory authority to award attorneys fees as sanctions in the separately-filed domestic violence case. See Belmont v. Belmont, 761 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Abraham v. Abraham, 700 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner, 693 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Therefore, we reverse the award of attorneys fees award as sanctions to Labiner. Accordingly, we affirm the amended final judgment and the denial of the motion for rehearing, but we reverse the attorneys fees award to Labiner. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2018)…case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Hall v. Lopez, 213 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), which certified direct conflict with the Third District Court of Appeal’s decisions in Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), and Cisneros v. Cisneros, 831 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), and with the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Dudley v. Schmidt, 963 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), regarding whether an award of attorney’s fees pursuant…
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Van Exter v. Diodonet-Molina, 152 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…s, including reasonable fees for services performed, and the father’s ability to pay attorney’s fees. When determining an award of attorney’s fees, “[t]he primary factor a judge considers is the financial resources of the parties.” Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 700 (Fla.1997)); see also Derrevere v. Derrevere, 899 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that “the standard for awarding attorney’s fees in dissolution cases is ... the fina…
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Chaim David Gottfried and Sagit Tova Gottfried v. The Kutner LAW Firm, 34 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…to relieve the husband of sanctions was a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of attorney’s fees in accordance with its earlier oral announcement. See Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Levy v. Levy, 862 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).2 The parties also have made several arguments relating to the pending charging lien. As that lien has not been adjudicated, no issue regarding the charging lien is properly before…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1997)
- Belmont v. Belmont, 761 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Lewis v. Lewis, 689 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- Eli Levy v. Levy, 862 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)
- Baumgartner v. Sibylle Baumgartner, 693 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Barth Satuloff v. Am. Reliance Ins. Co., 700 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Abraham v. Sherrie Lleo Abraham, 700 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Binker v. Binker, 781 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)