CHAIM DAVID GOTTFRIED AND SAGIT TOVA GOTTFRIED, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE KUTNER LAW FIRM, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2010-03-24
Nos. 3D09-415, 3D08-2848, 3D08-2976
Before COPE, GERSTEN and LAGOA, JJ.
34 So. 3d 56 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2010) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

In this matrimonial appeal, the trial court awarded attorney's fees against the husband as a sanction for absconding with marital assets mid-trial and remaining absent for four months. The court upheld its authority to impose these fees even after the parties entered a marital settlement agreement providing for each party to bear its own fees, holding that the decision to relieve sanctions was discretionary with the trial court.


Holding

The trial court had the authority to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for the husband's absconding behavior, and there was no abuse of discretion in maintaining this sanction despite the parties' subsequent marital settlement agreement. The decision whether to relieve a party of sanctions is within the discretion of the trial court.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has the discretion to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for a party's sanctionable behavior, even after the parties enter into a marital settlement agree…

[2] A marital settlement agreement does not preclude a trial court from enforcing a prior oral ruling assessing attorney's fees as a sanction for a party's misconduct.

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Key Quotes

“This case is unlike the ones the parties rely on. In this case the husband absconded in midtrial, taking with him some of the marital assets, and was gone for four months. This was most definitely sanctionable behavior, and the trial court ordered that the husband would be sanctioned in the form of attorney's fees.”

The court's key distinction: the fees were a sanction for misconduct, not a modification of the settlement agreement.

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Facts & Procedural History

During a matrimonial trial scheduled to resume on February 29, 2008, the husband absconded to Israel taking marital assets and remained absent for fou…

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Opinion of the Court
COPE, J.

COPE, J.

This is an appeal of a judgment for attorney’s fees in a matrimonial proceeding. The question is whether the trial court had the authority to enter this attorney’s fee award. We affirm.

The underlying matrimonial proceeding went to trial on January 16 and 17, 2008, and both parties were present. The trial was scheduled to resume on February 29. In the interim, the husband went to Israel, taking marital assets with him. He did not return to Florida for four months.

The trial court made an oral ruling that the husband would be responsible for the additional attorney’s fees of the wife’s counsel attributable to attempting to obtain the husband’s return to this jurisdiction and completing the dissolution proceedings. The husband eventually returned.

After further proceedings, the husband and wife decided to settle the litigation without the assistance of their counsel and they entered into a marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided that each party would be responsible for his or her own attorney’s fees and costs.

The parties presented the marital settlement agreement to the trial court. After making inquiry of the parties regarding the agreement, the court ruled that it would approve the marital settlement agreement, with one exception. The court ruled that it would assess attorney’s fees against the husband in accordance with its earlier oral pronouncement, because of the husband’s absenting himself from the jurisdiction. The court reserved jurisdiction in the final judgment for this purpose.

The husband and wife both objected. They contended that since the marital settlement agreement provided for each party to bear his or her own attorney’s fees, it followed that there should be no assessment of attorney’s fees against the husband. The parties argued that an award of attorney’s fees to the wife’s counsel was for the benefit of the wife, and that the wife, by entering into the marital settlement agreement, had waived any such *58claim. The trial court overruled the objection.

At a subsequent hearing the trial court took evidence pursuant to the reservation of jurisdiction. The court awarded $90,237.75 in attorney’s fees for the post-absconding legal work. The court ordered those fees to be paid by the husband to the law firm. The husband and wife have appealed.1

The husband and wife rely on cases which hold that a trial court cannot remake a marital settlement agreement simply because the court believes that one of the parties has made a bad bargain. See Williams v. Williams, 939 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Petracca v. Petracca, 706 So.2d 904, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

This case is unlike the ones the parties rely on. In this case the husband absconded in midtrial, taking with him some of the marital assets, and was gone for four months. This was most definitely sanctionable behavior, and the trial court ordered that the husband would be sanctioned in the form of attorney’s fees. The husband and wife later entered a marital settlement agreement, and in effect, asked the court to withdraw its earlier oral announcement assessing attorney’s fees against the husband as a sanction. Whether to relieve the husband of sanctions was a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s imposition of attorney’s fees in accordance with its earlier oral announcement. See Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So.2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007); Levy v. Levy, 862 So.2d 48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).2

The parties also have made several arguments relating to the pending charging lien. As that lien has not been adjudicated, no issue regarding the charging lien is properly before us.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Earline Alexander, 90 So. 3d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …22 nine times the largest non-economic damage award affirmed by any other district court in an Engle progeny case,23 and almost 87 times larger than the non-economic damage award to the surviving spouse affirmed in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Lukacs, 34 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).24 These comparisons highlight the excessiveness of the compensatory damage award in this case and support my view that the award is far outside the reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate. Accordingly, for th…
  • …nd Request to Take Judicial Notice, filed on November 9, 2011, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 1D10-4585. . See, e.g., Lukacs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 01-03822-CA 23 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Nov. 14, 2008) (verdict June 11, 2002), aff'd, 34 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Naugle v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 07-036736CA (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 18, 2010) (verdict Nov. 19, 2009); Tate v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No.2007-CA-021723 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Aug. 6, 2010) (verdict July 8, 2010). . See, e.g…
  • Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Allyson Kayton, 104 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)
    …Liggett Grp. LLC v. Campbell, 60 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So. 3d 307, 311-12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); Lukacs v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 01-03822 CA 23 (Fla. 17th Cir.Ct. Nov. 14, 2008), aff'd 34 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). We thus affirm the compensatory damages award. Motion for New Trial Based on Striking of Statute of Repose Defense on Claim for Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Concealment Philip Morris argues that the trial court erred in stri…

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