ALEXANDER C. WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alexander Wilson challenged his resentence following a partial grant of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the trial court failed to conduct a proper Faretta inquiry before allowing him to self-represent at the resentencing hearing. The appellate court found the absence of an adequate Faretta inquiry constitutes per se reversible error and remanded for resentencing.
The trial court's failure to conduct an adequate Faretta inquiry before allowing self-representation at resentencing constitutes per se reversible error. A resentencing is a de novo proceeding to which full due process considerations attach, and a defendant is entitled to counsel at this critical stage unless he validly waives that right through a knowing and intelligent waiver after a proper Faretta inquiry.
[1] A resentencing hearing is a de novo proceeding to which the full panoply of due process considerations attaches.
[2] A defendant is entitled to representation of counsel at a resentencing hearing, which is considered a critical stage of the proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A resentencing is a de novo proceeding to which 'the full panoply of due process considerations attaches.'”
Establishes that resentencing proceedings receive full constitutional protections, making adequate representation or valid waiver essential
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilson was convicted of eight counts of forgery and seven counts of uttering a forged instrument and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. He filed …
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PER CURIAM.
In this Anders
case, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed after his rule 3.800(a) motion was partially granted and he was resentenced. He alleges that the trial court committed per se reversible error when it failed to conduct a proper Faretta
inquiry prior to allowing him to represent himself at the resentencing hearing. The state concedes that remand for resentencing is required.
The appellant was convicted of eight counts of forgery and seven counts of uttering a forged instrument and was sentenced to a total of forty years’ imprisonment. The appellant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence raising a number of claims which the trial court denied in part and granted in part. The trial court found that the appellant’s scoresheet had been improperly calculated and that the appellant was entitled to be resentenced under a corrected scoresheet. The trial court denied the appellant’s remaining claims for relief. After a hearing the appellant was resentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling forty years.
A resentencing is a de novo proceeding to which “the full panoply of due process considerations attaches.” Gonzalez v. State, 838 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). As such, a defendant is entitled to representation of counsel at this “critical stage” of the proceedings. Id.; Sandoval, 884 So. 2d at 215. When a defendant makes clear his desire to represent himself at a critical stage, the trial court is obligated to conduct a Faretta inquiry to determine if a defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel and is “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.111(d). Although an adequate Faretta hearing does not require “magic words,” the trial court must ensure that the defendant has a general understanding of his rights and is proceeding with his “eyes wide open.” Potts v. State, 718 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla.1998). In the instant case, the trial court clearly did not conduct an adequate Faretta hearing after the appellant indicated that he wished to represent himself.3 The failure to conduct a Faretta inquiry is per se reversible error. See State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993); Case v. State, 865 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Sandoval v. State, 884 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also Gonzalez v. State, 838 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (holding that “the lack of representation [at resentencing] is not a sentencing error, but rather a due process error,” and thus the issue may be raised on appeal even if it was not preserved).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the appellant’s sentence for a new resentencing hearing. At that time the appellant may waive his right to representation if the trial court conducts an adequate Faret-ta hearing and determines that the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing with either appointed counsel or a valid waiver of the right to counsel.
BARFIELD, VAN NORTWICK, and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation, however, a trial court must examine the defendant to make sure the waiver of counsel is knowingly and intelligently made before allowing the defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel).
.During the resentencing the following exchange took place:
Court: All right. We’re here for resentencing. Mr. Wilson, do you wish to continue to represent yourself?
Defendant: Yes, sir. Court: Okay. I will hear anything you'd like to say with regard to the sentences to be imposed in those eight counts.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Cuyler v. State, 131 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…te, 751 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). A trial court’s failure to conduct a Faretta hearing at a critical stage of the criminal proceedings constitutes per se reversible error. See Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla.2008); Wilson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The state concedes that remand for re-sentencing is required. We reverse the imposed sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. REVERSED and REMANDED. VAN NORTWICK, PADOVANO, and SWANSON, JJ., Concur. . Faret…
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Howard v. State, 147 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…tical stage and conduct a Faretta inquiry if the defendant rejects the renewed offer is per se reversible error. See Cuyler v. State, 131 So. 3d 827, 828 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); Travis v. State, 969 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Wilson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Here, although the trial court repeatedly renewed the offer of counsel at the hearings leading up to final sentencing, it did not do a Faretta inquiry until just prior to imposing sentence. The “Phase I” hearings were…
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Tajhon Roderick Wilson v. State, 76 So. 3d 1085 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…of the criminal proceedings constitutes per se reversible error. See Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 379 (Fla.2008); Davis v. State, 10 So. 3d 176, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Flowers v. State, 976 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Wilson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Accordingly, we must determine whether the commencement of Wilson’s trial in this instance should be regarded as a crucial stage of the proceedings requiring the renewal of the offer of assistance of counsel under rule…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. Young, 626 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1993)
- Potts v. State, 718 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1998)
- Laine v. State, 838 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Vincente Sandoval v. State, 884 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
- Case v. State, 865 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)