LEROY BACH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court affirmed denial of postconviction relief where appellant claimed breach of plea agreement based on later sexual predator designation, holding that trial court had authority to impose any lawful sentence upon probation violation regardless of original plea terms.
Upon probation violation, a trial court may impose any sentence lawfully available for the original crime, even if the original plea agreement contemplated a different disposition.
[1] Upon revocation of probation, a trial court may impose any sentence lawfully available for the underlying offense without regard to the terms of the original plea agreeme…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The events which bring about a revocation open a new chapter in which the court ought to be able to mete out any punishment within the limits prescribed for the crime.”
Court cited Aponte v. State to explain the scope of sentencing authority upon probation revocation.
Appellant entered a plea agreement resulting in probation with designation as a sexual offender. Years later, when he violated probation, the trial co…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Sentencing Authority cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for postconviction relief. He claims newly discovered evidence that his plea agreement to violation of probation was breached when the court later found him to be a sexual predator, several years after his sentencing for violation of probation. His original plea agreement, which resulted in probation, provided for designation as a sexual offender.
However, when he violated the terms of his probation, the trial court was free to impose any sentence which it could have lawfully imposed before placing him on probation. See Aponte v. State, 810 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (“The events which bring about a revocation open a new chapter in which the court ought to be able to mete out any punishment within the limits prescribed for the crime.”). Appellant’s original crimes occurred prior to October 1, 1995, and section 775.21, et. seq., Florida Statutes (1993), required his designation as a sexual predator based on his qualifying convictions, without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. See § 775.23, Fla. Stat. (1993).
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that he has not alleged any legally sufficient ground for relief.
In a motion for rehearing in the trial court, he also raises a claim of affirmative misadvice. This claim cannot be entertained for the first time on rehearing. Even if we thought that he could state such a claim, it would be barred as successive if it were treated as a new motion. See Reid v. State, 745 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
STEVENSON, C.J., STONE and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Thompson v. State, 50 So. 3d 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…is appeal regarding affirmative misad-vice was unpreserved in the circuit court. The defendant did not expressly allege affirmative misadvice in his motion to withdraw plea and has yet to allege what that affirmative misadvice was. In Bach v. State, 953 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), we held that a claim of affirmative misad-vice cannot be entertained for the first time on a motion for rehearing in the trial court. Id. at 23. Logically, such a claim cannot be entertained for the first time on appeal either.…
Authorities Cited
- Waymond Joe Gibson v. State, 810 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
- Butler v. State, 745 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)