MICHAEL D. GEE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Michael Gee, an inmate in Georgia, requested return to Florida to face pending felony charges and invoked his right to a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The court held that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p) applies to IAD speedy trial claims, requiring a defendant to file a specific notice of expiration before the speedy trial right can be enforced, and that Gee's failure to comply with this procedural requirement was fatal to his motion to dismiss.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p) applies to speedy trial claims under the IAD. A defendant must comply with the notice requirements of rule 3.191(p) to invoke speedy trial rights, including filing a notice of expiration and allowing the state a ten-day window to bring the defendant to trial. The trial court properly denied Gee's motion to dismiss because he failed to comply with this procedural requirement.
[1] A defendant seeking to invoke speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in Florida must comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p).
[2] A defendant is not entitled to discharge on speedy trial grounds without filing a proper "notice of expiration of speedy trial time."
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Article 111(a) of the IAD, which controls this proceeding, provides for trial to be held within 180 days of receipt of the request by the clerk of the court and the State Attorney”
Establishes the 180-day speedy trial deadline under the IAD that governs this case
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGee, an inmate in a Georgia prison, requested return to Nassau County, Florida to be tried on pending felony charges. His request complied with the IA…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Notice Of Expiration Of Speedy Trial Time cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Michael D. Gee petitions for a writ of prohibition, contending that his right to a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, section 941.45, Florida Statutes, (IAD) was violated. We have jurisdiction, see Bogue v. Fennelly, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Gee, then an inmate in a Georgia prison, made a request for return to Nassau County for disposition of certain felony charges pending against him there. The request complied with the IAD and was received and filed by the clerk of the circuit court on July 5, 2006, and the State Attorney acknowledged receipt of the request on July 13, 2006. Article 111(a) of the IAD, which controls this proceeding, provides for trial to be held within 180 days of receipt of the request by the clerk of the court and the State Attorney and thus the speedy trial time expired on January 9, 2007, at the latest. Gee’s defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds on January 16, 2007, and after a hearing, the motion was denied.
In the trial court, the state argued that it was entitled to the “window of recapture” set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(p). Under that rule subdivision, the defendant must file a “notice of expiration of speedy trial time” and, within five days thereafter, the court shall hold a hearing. If it finds the defendant is correct, the state shall have ten days to bring the defendant to trial. Without a proper “notice of expiration of speedy trial time” the defendant is not entitled to discharge on speedy trial grounds. State v. McCullers, 932 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Petitioner argues that he filed his motion to dismiss in reliance on the IAD and therefore rule 3.191 does not apply. However, cases such as Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla.1994) and State v. Garza, 807 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) indicate otherwise. In light of those cases, we find that rule 3.191, or at least subdivision (p) thereof, applies to a party seeking to invoke his or her speedy trial rights under the IAD in this state. The correctness of this conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the IAD itself contains no procedural provisions for enforcement of the act’s right to speedy trial in the circuit court.
The circuit court did not err in denying Gee’s motion to dismiss on these facts. The petition for writ of prohibition is therefore denied.
PETITION DENIED.
BROWNING, C.J., KAHN, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cuevas-Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr. (Duval County) (M.D. Fla. 2023)
Authorities Cited
- Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994)
- State v. McCULLERS, 932 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
- Silveus v. Silveus, 807 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Cooper v. State, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
- Bogue v. The Honorable John E. Fennelly, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)