ROBERT ALLEN ARMATAGE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this direct criminal appeal, Armatage challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search. The appellate court reversed, finding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop and detention, thus rendering the subsequent search unlawful.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time of the stop. To justify a stop, an officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity based on the totality of circumstances, which was absent here.
[1] Activating a patrol car's red and blue lights constitutes a show of authority amounting to an investigatory stop.
[2] An investigatory stop of a vehicle is justified only when law enforcement officers have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the occupants of criminal acti…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity" based upon "the totality of circumstances.”
Establishes the legal standard for reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn arresting officer activated his red and blue lights and pulled up behind a truck driven by Armatage with a female passenger. The officer detained b…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Particularized And Objective Basis cases and more on FLexlaw
WEBSTER, J.
In this direct criminal appeal, appellant challenges an order denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of a truck he was driving. Because we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his stop and detention of appellant and his passenger, we reverse.
The state correctly conceded in the trial court that the arresting officer detained appellant and his female passenger when he pulled up behind their truck and activated the red and blue lights on his patrol car. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (activating flashing blue lights constitutes a show of authority amounting to an investigatory stop). In fact, the officer candidly testified that appellant and his passenger were not free to leave at that point.
The state argues that the stop was valid because the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he made it. A law enforcement officer “may briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are involved in criminal activity.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985).
However, to have a reasonable (or founded) suspicion, “the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity” based upon “the totality of circumstances.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). In this ease, the problem with the state’s argument is that the arresting officer conceded that, when he made the stop, he did not have any reason to believe that appellant or his passenger had committed, or was about to commit, any crime.
Moreover, our review of the record satisfies us that the arresting officer did not have any “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that either appellant or his passenger was engaged in any criminal activity at the time of the stop.
Because, at the time of the stop, the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion that either appellant or his passenger was engaged in criminal activity, the trial court should have granted appellant’s motion to suppress. See Graham v. State, 714 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Its failure to do so constituted reversible error. Moreover, because it is clear that the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress was dispositive, see, e.g., Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382, 384 (Fla.1979); State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla.1971); Fernandez v. State, 917 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand with directions that the trial court enter an order discharging appellant. REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
ALLEN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
G.M. v. State, 19 So. 3d 973 (Fla. 2009)…ent that those decisions apply a rule of law that the use of emergency lights to identify police officers when approaching a vehicle constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 536. The Third District identified Armatage v. State, 954 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Koppelman v. State, 876 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Errickson v. State, 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Siplin v. State, 795 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. St…
-
G.M. v. State, 981 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…pon application of a per se rule holding that the use of emergency lights to identify officers as police officers when approaching an already stopped vehicle, constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure, we certify direct conflict. See Armatage v. State, 954 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Koppelman v. State, 876 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Errickson v. State, 855 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Siplin v. State, 795 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Hrezo v. St…
Authorities Cited
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1981)
- United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (U.S. 1985)
- State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971)
- Brown v. State, 376 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1979)
- Brooks v. State, 745 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Jamall Graham v. State, 714 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Fernandez v. State, 917 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)