MICHAEL SCHIFFRIN & ASSOCIATES, P.A., APPELLANT,
v.
GEORGE KORALY, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2007-03-21
No. 3D06-2724
Before RAMIREZ, WELLS, and LAGOA, JJ.
957 So. 2d 655 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2007) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A law firm sued its former client in Miami-Dade County for breach of a contingency fee agreement, and the client moved to transfer venue to Brevard County where he resided. The appellate court reversed the transfer, holding that when a contract for payment is silent on the place of payment, the cause of action accrues where the creditor has its principal place of business.


Holding

The court held that when a written contract fails to specify the place of payment, a cause of action for failure to pay money due under the contract is properly brought in the county where the plaintiff has its principal place of business. Therefore, the trial court erred in transferring venue from Miami-Dade County to Brevard County.


Headnotes

[1] A cause of action for payment under a contract that does not specify a place of payment is properly brought in the county where the plaintiff has its principal place of b…

[2] When a contract for services is silent on the place of payment, the law implies that payment is to be made at the plaintiff's principal place of business.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“A cause of action for venue purposes accrues in the county where the contract is breached... If a plaintiff alleges breach of a covenant to pay money due or already earned under a contract, the cause of action accrues where performance of the act of payment was to occur.”

Establishes the foundational rule for determining venue in breach of contract cases involving payment obligations

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Schiffrin, a Miami-Dade County law firm, entered into a retainer agreement with Koraly, a Brevard County resident, to represent him in an insurance cl…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
LAGOA, Judge.

LAGOA, Judge.

Appellant, Michael Schiffrin & Associates, P.A. (“Schiffrin”), appeals an order transferring venue from Miami-Dade County to Brevard County. We reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Schiffrin is a professional association whose principal place of business is located in Miami-Dade County. On December 12, 2005, the defendant, George Koraly (“Ko-raly”), a resident of Brevard County, executed a retainer agreement with Schiffrin. In the retainer agreement, Schiffrin agreed to represent Koraly in a claim against Nationwide Insurance for property damage caused to Koraly’s home by Hurricane Jeanne. Specifically, the retainer agreement stated:

As indicated to you previously, we would agree to represent you with regard to your claim against Nationwide Insurance for the property damage portion of your claim, which damage was caused by Hurricane Jeanne on or about September 25, 2004 on a thirty percent (30%) contingency basis. This means that from any and all amounts we are successful in recovering, whether by settlement, judgment, verdict or award, we would be entitled to 30% of the GROSS amount, to wit: before the deduction of any and all other fees due to other service providers, experts, as well as prior to the issuance of payments for all costs and/or expenses which are outstanding at that time.

The retainer agreement, however, was silent as to the place of payment for Schiff-rin’s fee.

After execution of the retainer agreement, Schiffrin drafted a summons and two-page complaint and mailed them to Koraly on January 10, 2006 for his review. Pursuant to Koraly’s instructions, however, Schiffrin did not file suit as Koraly was in negotiations with the insurance company “in an attempt to resolve this matter amicably.”1 On February 6, 2006,2 and March 6, 2006,3 Schiffrin sent two additional letters to Koraly inquiring as to the status of the settlement negotiations.

After learning that Koraly had settled his claim with the insurance company for $190,000.00, Schiffrin sued Koraly in Miami-Dade County for breach of contract. In the complaint, Schiffrin alleges that Ko-raly failed to pay the thirty percent (30%) contingency fee due under the retainer agreement and that Schiffrin complied with all terms and conditions of the agreement and with all conditions precedent. Koraly, a resident of Brevard County, moved for a change of venue, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b), asserting that the “cause of action framed by these allegations revolve around the insurance proceeds for the [defendant's residence located in Micco, Brevard County, Florida.” The trial court granted the motion and this appeal ensued.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Schiffrin argues that, because the action is one for a liquidated amount due under a contract that does not state a place of payment, the general rule that payment is due where the creditor resides or has a place of business applies. Koraly, however, characterizes the agreement as one for services, and argues that the rule that a cause of action accrues where services are due under the contract applies to the instant case.

We find Koraly’s argument unpersuasive given the following well-settled principle of law:

A cause of action for venue purposes accrues in the county where the contract is breached. Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). If a plaintiff alleges breach of a covenant to pay money due or already earned under a contract, the cause of action accrues where performance of the act of payment was to occur. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934); M.A. Kite Co. v. A.C. Samford, Inc., 130 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).... [W]hen a written contract fails to specify the place where payments are to be made, a cause of action for failure to pay is properly brought in the county where the plaintiff has its principal place of business.

Sunshine Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Bob Anslow Yacht Sales, Inc., 669 So. 2d 342, 343-344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting Ryan v. Mobile Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 594 So. 2d 845, 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)).

Here, the complaint contains a single count for breach of contract for failure to make payment under the retainer agreement. Because Schiffrin alleges that it performed under the retainer agreement and that Koraly failed to pay the thirty percent (30%) contingency fee due under the agreement, the cause of action accrues where the payment was to occur.4 As noted previously, because the retainer agreement did not provide for a place of payment, a cause of action for failure to pay is properly brought in the county where Schiffrin has its principal place of business. Because Sehiffrin’s principal place of business is in Miami-Dade County, the trial court erred in transferring the case to Brevard County. Accordingly, the trial court’s order transferring venue is reversed and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

. Schiffrin's January 10, 2006 letter enclosing the draft summons and complaint stated in pertinent part:

Dear Mr. Koraly: In accordance with your telephone notification of January 6, 2005, I herewith confirm that I will not file suit against the insurance company on your behalf until further notification from you. It is my understanding that Epic Group is negotiating with the insurance company in an attempt to resolve this matter amicably.

In the meantime, I herewith enclose a copy of the Summons and Complaint which I have prepared for your review. Please advise immediately if it appears that settlement of your claim is not forthcoming so that I can proceed with the lawsuit against Nationwide Insurance Company of Florida on your behalf.

. The February 6, 2006 letter stated in pertinent part:

Dear Mr. Koraly: On January 10, 2006, I wrote to you confirming your notification of January 6, 2005 to my office by telephone that I should hold-off filing the lawsuit in this matter as Epic Group was negotiating with the insurance company in an attempt to resolve your claim amicably. I have not received anything from you or Epic Group concerning this matter and I would appreciate your updating me. By copy of this letter I am likewise requesting that Epic Group provide me with a written update for my file. Needless to say, if by now the matter has not been resolved and settlement negotiations have broken down, you would best be served by filing suit.

.The March 6, 2006 letter stated in pertinent part:

Dear Mr. Koraly: I have not heard from you in response of my last two letters to you with regard to the filing of the lawsuit in the above-captioned matter, which lawsuit was prepared and sent to you for approval some time ago. As a matter of fact, you had indicated that you were attempting to amicably resolve your claim with the insurance company directly and since I have not heard from you as to whether a resolution was accomplished, I need for you to immediately provide me with a written update so that I can note my file accordingly. Needless to say, if by this time the insurance company still refuses to honor your claim, my opinion would be that you would be best served by filing suit.

. Because the matter before us is solely whether venue is proper in Miami-Dade County, we make no decision today regarding whether Schiffrin, who apparently never filed suit on Koraly's behalf, satisfied the terms and conditions of the retainer agreement.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Metnick & Levy, P.A. v. Seuling, 123 So. 3d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …payment [i]s the Florida office” of the law firm, placing Seuling within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute. Armaly v. Practice Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 533 So. 2d 920, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); see, e.g., Michael Schiffrin & Assocs., P.A. v. Koraly, 957 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that where defendant/client failed to pay a contingency fee, and the agreement does not specify the location of payment, venue is proper at the plaintiff/law firm’s principal place of business). Having concluded tha…
  • …o specify the place where payments are to be made, a presumption is created that a cause of action for nonpayment is properly brought in the county where the plaintiff has its principal place of business. Michael Schiffrin & Assocs., P.A. v. Koraly, 957 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). This presumption may be overcome by a contrary lengthy, uninterrupted pattern of conduct between the parties. See Pinch-A-Penny, Inc. v. Mudd, 464 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The affidavit of Sanford Auto’s vice president…
  • Raja J. Aboul-Hosn v. Frost VAN DEN Boom & Smith, P.A., 117 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)
    …d DCA 1970) (recognizing that when a debtor-creditor contract involves the payment of money and does not specify place of payment, venue is proper where the creditor has an established place of business); Michael Schiffrin & Assocs., P.A. v. Koraly, 957 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that law firm’s suit for client’s breach of contingency fee agreement could be filed where law firm had its principal place of business when agreement did not specify place of payment). On the other hand, if this is…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw