JEFFERY DANA WATKINS, APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jeffery Dana Watkins appealed his conviction for habitual offender driving while licensed revoked, challenging the trial court's acceptance of his no contest plea after he discharged his attorney to represent himself. The court reversed because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing as required before accepting a waiver of counsel.
No. The trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) and Faretta v. California. The failure to conduct such a hearing is per se reversible error.
[1] A trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry into a defendant's comprehension and capacity before considering a waiver of counsel to be knowing and intelligent.
[2] Before accepting a waiver of counsel, a trial court must advise the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused's comprehension of that offer and the accused's capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Before determining whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent, the court shall advise the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.”
This quote establishes the legal standard required under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) for accepting a waiver of counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWatkins wanted to accept a plea offer against his attorney's advice and requested to discharge his counsel and represent himself. The trial court brie…
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WHATLEY, Judge.
Jeffery Dana Watkins appeals his judgment for habitual offender driving while licensed revoked. Watkins contends that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Faretta
hearing before accepting his no contest plea. We agree and reverse.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) provides as follows:
A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused’s comprehension of that offer and the accused’s capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Before determining whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent, the court shall advise the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. Pursuant to the requirements of rule 3.111(d)(2) and Faretta, when a defendant indicates that he wants to discharge his attorney, a trial court is required to inform the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation and to warn him of the severity of the charge and the possible sentence. See Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389, 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The failure of a trial court to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing is per se reversible error. Hutchens v. State, 730 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Wilson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1225, 1226-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
In the present case, Watkins wanted to accept a plea offer, which was against the advice of his attorney, and therefore, he wanted to discharge his attorney. The following discussion occurred before Watkins entered his plea:
MR. WATKINS: Yeah I want to fire my lawyer. THE COURT: You want to fire your lawyer and represent yourself? MR. WATKINS: Yes. THE COURT: Okay, you want to do that? DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay, very well, let’s go back to it. Uh, Mr. Uh, Jeffery Dana Watkins, you want to discharge your lawyer? MR. WATKINS: Yes. THE COURT: You want to represent yourself? MR. WATKINS: Yes, Sir. THE COURT: Okay, very well. You’re charged with a crime of driving while license suspended or revoked as a habit ual traffic offender. It’s a felony in the third degree, carries up to five years in state prison. MR. WATKINS: Yes, Sir. Thereafter, the trial court began the plea colloquy. The trial court erred in failing to conduct an adequate Faretta hearing. It was required to inquire about Watkins’ age, education, mental condition, and experience and knowledge of criminal proceedings. See Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Further, the trial court was required to inform Watkins of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. Id. “Without such warnings, Faretta’s mandate that the record establish that a defendant has knowingly and intelligently exercised the right of self-representation ... cannot be fulfilled.” Id. at 126.
Accordingly, we reverse Watkins’ judgment and sentence for driving while license revoked and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
FULMER, C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur. . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).
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Citator
Cited By
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Montgomery v. State, 1 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…xercised the right of self-representation “with eyes open’ cannot be fulfilled.” Jones, 658 So. 2d at 125-26 (citing Taylor v. State, 605 So. 2d 958 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)); see also Watkins v. State, 959 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Based on the record before us, the trial court here failed to inquire into Montgomery’s capacity to represent himself and failed to explain the seriousness or potential outcomes of Montgomery’s upcoming violation of probation he…
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Curtis v. State, 32 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…defendant’s] age, education, mental condition, and experience and knowledge of criminal proceedings. Further, the trial court [is] required to inform [the defendant] of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation.” Watkins v. State, [*761] 959 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Jones v. State, 658 So. 2d 122, 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). It is only after the court is satisfied that the accused has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel that the accused should be allowed to proceed pro…
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Garren v. State, 976 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)…allowed to withdraw his pleas. REVERSED AND REMANDED. TORPY, J., concurs. THOMPSON, Senior Judge, concurs specially, with opinion. . See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). As explained in Watkins v. State, 959 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), before allowing a defendant to proceed at any critical stage of a criminal proceeding without representation, a trial court is required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2) and Faretta "to inform the defendant o…
Authorities Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975)
- Fussell v. State, 658 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Wilson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Hutchens v. State, 730 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)