LISA VIVIAN F/K/A LISA SCHEMBARI, APPELLANT,
v.
GIOVANNI SCHEMBARI, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's petition to relocate with the minor children.
Following a dissolution of marriage, the mother, who was the primary custodial parent, petitioned to relocate with the parties' two minor children to …
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PER CURIAM.
This case presents yet another difficult issue regarding a primary custodial parent’s efforts to relocate with the minor children following a dissolution of marriage. The trial court denied the mother’s petition, and she now appeals, arguing abuse of discretion and failure to properly apply the statutory factors. We disagree and affirm.
The marriage in this case was dissolved in 2004, following a six-year marriage resulting in two minor children of the parties. The mother was the primary residential parent, with shared parental responsibility with the father, who had liberal contact and access with the children.
Then the mother remarried, and her new husband’s job was relocated to Huntsville, Alabama. The mother petitioned the court to allow her to move there with the children, but the trial court denied relief, citing to the factors in section 61.13001(7), Florida Statutes (2006).
We affirm the order of the circuit court denying the former wife’s petition to relocate to Alabama. Substantial competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings concerning the statutory factors contained in section 61.13001(7). This court may not reweigh the evidence to make value judgments that are appropriate for the trial judge. See Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So. 2d 903, 904-05 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). We also find no error in the trial court’s questioning of the former wife. See § 90.615(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). The court’s questions pertained to considerations required by section 61.13001(7).
STONE, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Smith v. Smith, 971 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)…t further recourse. As it is the duty of the family division court to assess credibility and to weigh the evidence in this case, we decline the invitation to “make value judgments that are appropriate for the trial court judge.” Vivian v. Schembari, 966 So. 2d 492, 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Accordingly, we reverse the award of shared parental responsibility and remand with instructions to the trial court to make specific factual findings justifying Former Husband’s inclusion in major decision-making concerning…
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Valqui v. Lily Marie Rodriguez, 75 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…lable to the child, including working with the child on homework issues related to her ADHD. Neither we nor the father have located a case in which an appellate court has reversed a relocation order on facts nearly this close. Vivian v. Schembari, 966 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), cited by the father, was an affirmance of an order denying a primary residential parent’s efforts to relocate when her new husband’s job was relocated. In Chapman v. Prevatt, 845 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), a case like the p…
Authorities Cited
- Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)