DONALD L. BOTTERBUSCH, APPELLANT,
v.
TERRI L. BOTTERBUSCH, APPELLEE
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A Florida appellate court affirmed a trial court's approval of a mother's relocation from St. Lucie County to the Tampa area for a new job with the U.S. Customs Department. The father appealed, arguing for modification of custody, but the court found substantial competent evidence supported the relocation under statutory factors and rejected his custody modification request.
The court affirmed the trial court's approval of relocation, finding substantial competent evidence supported the decision under statutory factors. The court also affirmed the denial of the father's request to modify custody, holding that a parent's decision to relocate does not, absent other compelling circumstances, justify a change of custody.
[1] Appellate courts review trial court decisions on relocation for abuse of discretion.
[2] Appellate courts will affirm a trial court's relocation order if supported by substantial competent evidence regarding statutory factors.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An appellate court's standard of review of a trial court's order regarding relocation is whether the trial court abused its discretion.”
Establishes the applicable standard of review for relocation orders on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe mother, a St. Lucie County Sheriff's Department detective, accepted a new position with the United States Customs Department requiring relocation …
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PER CURIAM.
This is a case where two good parents disagree over the mother’s attempt to relocate from St. Lucie County to the Tampa area. The mother was a detective with the St. Lucie County Sheriff’s Department. She accepted a new job with the United States Customs Department which required her to move. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on March 18, 2003, and entered an order approving relocation. The father appeals. We affirm.
An appellate court’s standard of review of a trial court’s order regarding relocation is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Dorta-Duque v. Dorta-Duque, 791 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). We look to see if there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings concerning the statutory factors listed in section 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2002). Id.; see also Jones v. Jones, 633 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). We do not engage in “reweighing the evidence and making the value judgments that are appropriate for the trial judge.” Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Substantial competent evidence supported the trial court’s findings. The evidence showed that: 1) the mother would earn more money and work fewer hours in her new position; 2) the mother and child would live in a house twice the size of their current residence; 3) the child would attend an equal, if not better school than her school in Fort Pierce; and 4) the child would be able to continue gymnastics with a qualified teacher. The trial court believed that the mother would comply with visitation. She generally facilitated visitation in the past and would continue to do so in the future. The mother chose a new home located outside of Tampa close to an interstate highway for that very purpose.
The trial court recognized the difficulties that would arise with visitation because of the increased distance. Because the father did not anticipate a grant of relocation, he did not provide the court with a proposed visitation schedule if relocation occurred and refused to participate in any discussion about this issue. The mother’s proposed schedule provided a reduction from 156 days to 125 days. The trial court’s order encourages the parties to work with each other and be flexible on visitation, adopting the mother’s proposed schedule “only to the extent that the parties cannot agree between themselves on a visitation schedule.”
We affirm the trial court’s refusal to modify the final judgment to permit the father to have primary residential custody of the child. “A trial court may not modify custody or visitation ‘unless the party moving for such modification demonstrates: (1) a substantial or material change in the circumstances of the parties since the entry of the custody and visitation order; and (2) that the welfare of the child will be promoted by a change in custody and visitation.’ ” Chapman v. Prevatt, 845 So. 2d 976, 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting Knipe v. Knipe, 840 So. 2d 335, 339-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)). A primary residential parent’s decision to relocate, “in the absence of other compelling circumstances, does not in and of itself support a change of custody.” Id.
AFFIRMED.
FARMER, C.J., SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Jessyca Rossman v. Gino J. Profera, 67 So. 3d 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…tinuing meaningful relationship with the minor child was not supported by competent substantial evidence. We disagree. This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a petition to relocate for an abuse of discretion. See Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). This includes reviewing whether substantial competent evidence exists to support the trial court’s findings concerning the statutory factors. Id. One of the statutory factors a trial court must consider when a party asks t…
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Muller v. Melonie R. Muller, 964 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…ssolution of marriage. In its order, the trial court granted the Mother’s petition for relocation. The Father’s appeal follows. We review a trial court’s. order regarding relocation under an abuse of discretion standard. Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)(citing Dorta-Duque v. Dorta-Duque, 791 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)). In reviewing the trial court’s Order, we must determine if there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings under sec…1 / 2
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Ness v. Martinez, 249 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…ot be the same as that of the trial court, we can only review the record for supporting evidence, and cannot ‘“engage in ‘reweighing the evidence and making the value judgments that are appropriate for the trial judge.’” Botterbusch v. Botterbusch, 851 So. 2d 903, 904-05 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). The trial court did not ignore the evidence presented by Appellant, but found these benefits were outweighed by the negative impacts on the child tha…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Flint v. Fortson, 744 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Plimpton v. OLD Dixie Storage, Inc., 845 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- Dorta-Duque v. Marines Dorta-Duque, 791 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
- Heide M. Hess Jones v. Jones, 633 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Jagada Chambers v. State, 840 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- Knipe v. Knipe, 840 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)