RANDY REAVES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Randy Reaves appeals a postconviction court's order denying full jail credit for time served. The court reversed and remanded, finding that the postconviction court failed to properly address whether Reaves was entitled to continuous jail credit across multiple counts stemming from the same arrest and investigation.
The court reversed and remanded because the record did not conclusively refute Reaves' claim of continuous custody on counts arising from the same stop and investigation. Additionally, since Reaves' claim involved a disputed factual issue and was filed within two years of sentencing, the postconviction court should have considered it under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 rather than 3.800(a).
[1] A postconviction court should treat a sworn and facially sufficient motion for jail credit as filed under rule 3.850, even if improperly labeled as a rule 3.800 motion, w…
[2] A defendant is entitled to jail credit for the period of continuous custody stemming from acts alleged in an investigation, even if offenses arising from that investigati…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the record does not conclusively refute Reaves' claim that he was in custody continuously on counts that stem from the same stop and police investigation, we reverse and remand.”
Establishes the standard for reversing jail credit determinations where the record does not definitively disprove continuous custody claims.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReaves was arrested on August 29, 2003, for possession of a controlled substance and driving with a suspended license. A third count for sale and deli…
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VILLANTI, Judge.
Randy Reaves appeals the postconvietion court’s order on his motion to accredit jail time filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand with instructions.
Reaves was arrested for possession of a controlled substance (count two) and driving while license suspended or revoked (count three) on August 29, 2003. He was not arrested for sale or delivery of cocaine (count one) until September 26, 2003, although this offense also took place on August 29, 2003.
In his motion, Reaves claims that he is entitled to a total of 511 days’ jail credit. The postconviction court granted the motion but determined that he was only entitled to 406 days for count one, 433 days for count two, and 312 days for count three. It appears that each count of Reaves’ sentence stems from the original police stop and investigation conducted on August 29, 2003. The sale and delivery count was later added as evidenced by an arrest on September 26, 2003. However, all three counts were disposed of under the same case number. Reaves alleges he remained in jail continuously from August 29, 2003, until the February 4, 2004, sentencing hearing for acts alleged from the original police stop and investigation.
Because the record does not conclusively refute Reaves’ claim that he was in custody continuously on counts that stem from the same stop and police investigation, we reverse and remand. See McQueen v. State, 870 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Also, because Reaves’ “claim for jail credit involves a disputed issue of fact and he filed his sworn motion within two years of his ... sentence becoming final, the postconviction court should have treated his motion as filed pursuant to rule 3.850.” Richie v. State, 959 So. 2d 433, 434 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (observing that the postconviction court has discretion to consider a sworn and facially sufficient motion under rule 3.850 even if improperly labeled as a rule 3.800 motion).
Accordingly, on remand the postconviction court shall attach portions of the record that conclusively refute Reaves’ claim or, if necessary, hold an evidentiary hearing. Reaves appears to be scheduled for release in July 2008; therefore, his motion should receive immediate attention because any additional jail credit might prompt an earlier release.
Reversed and remanded.
WHATLEY and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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ALI v. State (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…t for a hearing as a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Defendant’s motion was sworn and timely filed under the rule. See Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955, 956-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Reaves v. State, 970 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing to Rinderer for the proposition “that the postconviction court has discretion to consider a sworn and facially sufficient motion under rule 3.850 even if improperly labeled as a rule 3.800 motion”). Additionally, des…
Authorities Cited
- Rinderer v. State, 857 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
- McQUEEN v. State, 870 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Richie v. State, 959 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)