JOSEPH RUDOLPH RUSCHIWAL, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHLEEN PATRICIA RUSCHIWAL, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in not conforming its final judgment to its oral pronouncement regarding mortgage payment credits and in awarding attorney's fees to the former wife.
The former husband appealed the trial court's final judgment awarding permanent and retroactive alimony, and a credit for mortgage payments. The final…
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LEVY, DAVID L., Associate Senior Judge.
Joseph Ruschiwal (former husband) appeals the trial court’s award of permanent alimony and an award of retroactive alimony to Kathleen Ruschiwal (former wife). We affirm the trial court’s alimony awards but remand for modification of its final judgment based on the parties’ stipulations here.
In its final judgment, the trial court stated that the former husband “is entitled to a credit for one-half of each mortgage payment that he has made during the time from the separation until the date of this order.” However, at the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the trial court stated on the record that the former husband “should be entitled to a credit for one-half of each mortgage payment that he has made during the time from the time of their separation until the date of the sale.” The former wife has stipulated that the trial court’s oral pronouncement is correct and that the final judgment is not correct. On review of the record, we agree that the trial court erred by not conforming its final judgment to the oral pronouncement. See Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
The former husband, citing Millen v. Millen, 658 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), argued that having placed the parties in the same relative financial position, it was error to require him to pay one-third of the former wife’s attorney’s fees. The former wife has stipulated that it was error for the trial court to have awarded her attorney’s fees. We agree.
Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to modify its final judgment in eon-formity with this decision and affirm in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CANADY and LaROSE, JJ., concur.
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Langford v. Eliza Hanna Masco, 991 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…visitation schedule ” and describing other duties concerning the establishment of a visitation schedule. (Emphases supplied.) This directive did not conform to the judge’s oral ruling, and therefore it must be corrected. See Ruschiwal v. Ruschiwal, 971 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that the circuit court erred when its written ruling did not conform to its oral pronouncement); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 614 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) [*429] (reversing when written order was inconsistent with…
Authorities Cited
- Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Millen v. Millen, 658 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)