SUE C. MILLEN, APPELLANT,
v.
TRACY L. MILLEN, APPELLEE
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Financial Resources Of Parties cases and more on FLexlaw
THREADGILL, Chief Judge.
The wife appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage requiring her to pay $500 per month in permanent periodic alimony and contribute 25% of the husband’s attorney’s fees.
We affirm the award of monthly permanent periodic alimony. The finding and judgment of the trial court come to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness. Palmer v. Palmer, 330 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). We find no error in the trial court’s award of alimony.
We reverse, however, the award of attorney’s fees to the husband. Having placed the parties in the same relative financial position, it was error to require the wife to pay the husband’s attorney’s fees. Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). The trial court made no findings as to the reasonableness of the fees. See Naugle. The amount of the fees is also absent from the final judgment. Considering the financial resources of both parties, the wife is in no better financial position than the husband to pay the fees.
In all other respects, we affirm the final judgment.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
ALTENBERND and BLUE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Knoff v. Knoff, 751 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…nes. See Widder v. Widder, 673 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In determining an award of attorney’s fees, a trial court must consider the parties’ relative financial positions, considering all circumstances and resources. See Millen v. Millen, 658 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). On remand, the trial court may reconsider the issue of attorney’s fees after awarding permanent alimony to the Wife, taking into consideration the parties’ relative financial positions. See Lowman v. Lowman, 724 So. 2d 648,…
-
Dibartolomeo v. Dibartolomeo, 679 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…as not an abuse of discretion because the dissolution placed the parties in the same relative financial position. See Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798, 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Millen v. Millen, 658 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We strike the cohabitation limitation portion of the final judgment and otherwise affirm. GLICKSTEIN, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., .concur. . See Alford v. Alford, 594 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Singer v. Singer, 652 So. 2d 454…
-
Ruschiwal v. Ruschiwal, 971 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…is not correct. On review of the record, we agree that the trial court erred by not conforming its final judgment to the oral pronouncement. See Gallardo v. Gallardo, 593 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The former husband, citing Millen v. Millen, 658 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), argued that having placed the parties in the same relative financial position, it was error to require him to pay one-third of the former wife’s attorney’s fees. The former wife has stipulated that it was error for the trial cour…
Authorities Cited
- Naugle v. Naugle, 632 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Palmer v. Palmer, 330 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)