MIAMI DADE COLLEGE, F/K/A MIAMI DADE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, FLORIDA, PETITIONER,
v.
TURNBERRY INVESTMENTS, INC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-04-30
No. 3D07-2721
Per Curiam
979 So. 2d 1211 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appellate court granted a writ of prohibition disqualifying a trial judge whose expressions of displeasure, extemporaneous remarks, and prognostication that the petitioner would lose created a reasonable fear of bias and unfair trial.


Holding

A trial judge must be disqualified when his expressions of displeasure with a case, extemporaneous exchanges with counsel, and public prognostication that a party will lose are sufficient to instill in a reasonably prudent person a fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.


Headnotes

[1] A trial judge must be disqualified when his public expressions of displeasure with a case and prognostication that a party will lose create a reasonable fear in a prudent…

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Key Quotes

“the judge's expression of displeasure with the case, his extemporaneous exchange with counsel and prognostication in open court that the Petitioner would lose the property and afford Respondents a profit, were sufficient to instill the fear that Petitioner would not receive a fair and impartial trial”

Court's explanation of why disqualification was warranted

Facts & Procedural History

Miami Dade College sought to disqualify the trial judge in a dispute with Turnberry Investments, Inc. The judge expressed displeasure with the case an…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We grant the petition for writ of prohibition challenging the trial court’s order denying the Petitioner’s motion to disqualify the trial judge. The motion was legally sufficient. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.330. Here, as in NRD Investments, Inc. v. Velazquez, 965 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), the judge’s expression of displeasure with the case, his extemporaneous exchange with counsel and prognostication in open court that the Petitioner would lose the property and afford Respondents a profit, were sufficient to instill the fear that Petitioner would not receive a fair and impartial trial. Enter. Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 968 (Fla.2001)(standard for determining whether motion is legally sufficient is whether facts alleged place reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair trial); Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 908 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)(judge calling wife in dissolution case “alimony drone” sufficient to place her in fear of not receiving fair trial).

Very recently, this court reached a similar conclusion. Grandview Palace Condominium, Association, Inc. v. City of North Bay Village, 974 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). There, the trial court “(1) announced in open court that he did not trust representatives of the developer; (2) threatened to jail anyone who opposed Marlin’s actions; and (3) stated that he had no concern for the financial consequences of his rulings.” Id. at 1171. That case granted prohibition, disqualifying the trial judge. We hold that prohibition should be granted here, as well.

We trust it will not be necessary to formally issue the writ.

Prohibition granted.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Molina v. Perez, 187 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)
    …the context of, and at this stage of, the dissolution proceeding, is sufficient to create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair hearing before this judge.” See Miami Dade College v. Turnberry Inv., Inc., 979 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So. 2d 424 (F…
  • Colarusso v. Brenna Myers Colarusso, 20 So. 3d 985 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)
    …n the context of, and at this stage of, the dissolution proceeding, is sufficient to create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair hearing before this judge. See Miami Dade College v. Tumberry Inv., Inc., 979 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d at 214; Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we gr…
  • …ed in the context of, and at this stage of the proceeding, is sufficient to create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear that he or she would not receive a fair hearing before this judge. See Miami Dade College v. Turnberry, Inv., Inc., 979 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214; Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we grant…

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