HEATHROW MASTER ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
LISLE D. ZULIA AND JAMES ZULIA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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Petitioners seek a writ of prohibition, preventing the trial judge from conducting further proceedings in Petitioner’s casé. “A motion to recuse or disqualify a trial judge is legally sufficient when the alleged facts would create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.” Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). A review of the verified motion to disqualify demonstrates that it is legally sufficient. The judge’s commentary concerning his personal experiences, when viewed in the context of, and at this stage of the proceeding, is sufficient to create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear that he or she would not receive a fair hearing before this judge. See Miami Dade College v. Turnberry, Inv., Inc., 979 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Valdes-Fauli, 903 So.2d 214; Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So.2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, we grant the petition. We are confident that it will be unnecessary to issue a formal writ.
PETITION GRANTED.
MONACO, C.J., ORFINGER and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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Westphal v. City OF ST. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)…kers who are totally disabled upon the expiration of temporary disability benefits but fail to prove prospectively that total disability will exist after the date of [maximum medjcal improvement].” Hadley, 78 So. 3d at 626 (quoting Crum v. Richmond, 46 So. 3d 633, 637 n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)). Although this Court must, whenever possible, construe statutes to effect a constitutional outcome, we may not salvage a plainly written statute by rewriting it. See Suit v. State, 906 So. 2d 1013, 1019 (Fla.2005) (“C…
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Westphal v. City OF ST. Petersburg/City OF ST. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…t); Rivendell of Ft. Walton v. Petway, 833 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (denying a disabled worker disability benefits because she was still improving and not yet at maximum medical improvement at the end of the 104-week period); Crum v. Richmond, 46 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (denying disability benefits one day after the expiration of temporary benefits because the disabled worker was still improving and had not yet reached maximum medical improvement).…1 / 4
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Matrix Emp. Leasing, Inc. v. Hadley, 78 So. 3d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…cal and persuasive today as it was 13 years ago. We have consistently applied the rule of law announced in Oswald over the past 13 years,5 most recently in East v. CVS Phar [*626] macy, Inc., 51 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and Crum v. Richmond, 46 So. 3d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). In Crum, we reaffirmed that: The test ... for PTD entitlement prior to the date of MMI is not, as the JCC appears to have concluded, whether a claimant is totally disabled upon the expiration of temporary disability benefit eli…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Valdes-Fauli v. Gonzalo F. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)
- Kopel v. Bernardo Kopel, 832 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
- Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Jane DOE and her spouse, 767 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Miami Dade Coll. v. Turnberry Invs., Inc., 979 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)