EDWARD L. MORGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Edward Morgan appealed an order prohibiting him from filing further pro se documents in his criminal case. The court reversed the prohibition order, holding that the trial court must first address the merits of Morgan's underlying rule 3.800 motion before imposing sanctions under State v. Spencer.
No. Before a trial court may issue an order prohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence, it must first address the merits of the claim. Only if it determines the claim to be frivolous may it then pursue a Spencer sanction after providing notice and an opportunity to show cause.
[1] A trial court must address the merits of a pro se motion before imposing sanctions prohibiting further pro se filings.
[2] A trial court may impose sanctions prohibiting further pro se filings after notice and an opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be imposed, provided the u…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Unfortunately, and most probably out of frustration, the trial court never addressed the merits of the rule 3.800(a) motion that was filed by the appellant.”
Identifies the critical procedural defect—the trial court issued the sanction order without ever evaluating the substance of Morgan's underlying motion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorgan was convicted of second degree murder with a firearm in 2001 after entering a guilty plea. Over the years, he filed numerous pleadings seeking …
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MONACO, J.
The appellant, Edward Morgan, appeals the order of the trial court prohibiting him, pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla.1999), from filing any further pro se documents in connection with his case. Because of a cart-before-the-horse problem, we remand this case to the trial court for initial consideration of the underlying rule 3.800 motion that gave rise to the Spencer order. Mr. Morgan filed a motion to correct sentence in accordance with rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking relief from the sentence imposed upon him in 2001, after his guilty plea to second degree murder with a firearm. It appears that Mr. Morgan has over the years filed a substantial number of pleadings seeking post-conviction relief in connection with this same case. Upon receipt of the current motion, the trial court issued an order to show cause why Mr. Morgan should not be barred from filing further pro se motions addressing this judgment and sentence pursuant to Spencer. After Mr. Morgan responded, the court immediately issued the order prohibiting further pro se filings that is the subject of this appeal.
Unfortunately, and most probably out of frustration, the trial court never addressed the merits of the rule 3.800(a) motion that was filed by the appellant. This motion was, of course, filed pro se before entry of the order prohibiting him from doing so. The State commendably suggests, and we agree, that before an order prohibiting further pro se attacks on a conviction and sentence can be rendered, the trial court must first address the merits of the claim. If it determines the claim to be frivolous, it may then pursue the Spencer sanction, after notice and an opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be imposed. See Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
Accordingly, we reverse the order prohibiting further pro se filings, and remand for consideration of the merits of Mr. Morgan’s postconviction claim. If appropriate, the trial court may then issue an order requiring Mr. Morgan to show cause why a Spencer sanction order should not be entered.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PLEUS and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Fitzgerald v. State, 18 So. 3d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)…ired to provide Fitzgerald with notice of the intended sanction and an opportunity to respond thereto, we reverse the order prohibiting Fitzgerald from filing further pro se pleadings. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla.1999); Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Epps v. State, 941 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). On remand, should the trial court choose to pursue this sanction again, it first must provide Fitzgerald notice and an opportunity to show cause why the sanction should not be…
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Orin A. Mims v. State, 994 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…estricts a litigant's right to proceed subsequently in court, it must address the merits of the claims advanced by the litigant and determine that they are frivolous before commencing down the road to bar future filings.”); see also Morgan v. State, 983 So. 2d 1230, 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Longv. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). . We applaud the dissent’s encomium to Clarence Gideon. See infra pp. 1236-37. We also agree that all too often, prisoners abuse their postconviction rights. See infra p.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999)
- Exum Walker v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Abram Jordan v. State, 760 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Long v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Miller v. State, 793 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)