TERRENCE SWEET, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a motion to enforce a plea agreement cannot be properly addressed in a rule 3.800(a) motion and must be filed under rule 3.850.
[1] A motion to enforce a plea agreement, even if framed as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, must be filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
[2] A defendant seeking to enforce a plea agreement, where the sentence imposed differs from the agreed-upon sentence, must file a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Proce…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSweet pleaded no contest and received a sentence different from the one he claims was agreed upon in the plea agreement. He filed a motion to correct …
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VILLANTI, Judge.
Terrence Sweet appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm the postconviction court’s order without prejudice to any right Sweet may have to file a rule 3.850 motion.
After entering a plea of no contest to the charges filed against him, Sweet received a sentence of ten years’ prison to be followed by five years’ probation on all counts, to run concurrently. In his rule 3.800(a) motion, Sweet alleged that his sentence was illegal because the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement was eighty-one months’ prison, not a fifteen-year split sentence. Specifically, Sweet wants the plea agreement enforced and to be resentenced to the agreed sentence. The postconviction court correctly dismissed this claim on the ground that it could not be properly addressed in a rule 3.800(a) motion.
Because there is no procedure for a “motion to enforce a plea agreement,” this claim must be filed pursuant to rule 3.850. See Hettick v. State, 977 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). Sweet’s sentence is the product of a negotiated plea agreement and, although he is only trying to correct his sentence, withdrawal of his plea is a potential consequence. See Nedd v. State, 855 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Had Sweet filed this motion pursuant to rule 3.850, it would have been timely. However, the postcon-viction court could not treat it as such because it was not properly sworn. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s order dismissing the motion. Because the time for filing a rule 3.850 motion expired while Sweet’s original motion was pending in the postconviction court, this affirmance is without prejudice for Sweet to file a properly sworn and facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion within thirty days from the issuance of the mandate in this case. See Heath v. State, 968 So. 2d 625, 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Houser v. State, 901 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Affirmed.
SILBERMAN and KELLY, JJ. Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (20 total)
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Williams v. State, 51 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…dit for prison time served on a separate offense.”). Furthermore, there is no separate postconviction procedure to enforce a plea agreement, and Williams would have to seek relief through Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See Sweet v. State, 987 So. 2d 747, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). However, the transcript of Williams’ violation of probation hearing refutes his claim that an agreement existed by which he would receive prison credit upon admitting the violations of his supervision. We therefore decline t…
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Almodovar v. State, 56 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ever, we must reverse the postconviction court’s decision on the merits and remand for the court to dismiss the motion with leave for Mr. Al-modovar to file a facially sufficient claim within thirty days of the date of its order. See Sweet v. State, 987 So. 2d 747, 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting that although the defendant was “only trying to correct his sentence, withdrawal of his plea is a potential consequence”). In the event that Mr. Almodovar timely files an amended facially sufficient motion and the c…
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Williams v. State, 263 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…ed. See Johnson v. State, 60 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. 2011); McDonald v. State, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); Williams v. State, 129 So. 3d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (table decision); Hughes v. State, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Sweet v. State, 987 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Brown v. State, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Haynes v. State, 106 So. 3d 481 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013); Paul v. State, 830 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). NORTHCUTT, SLEET, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.…
Previewing 3 of 20 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nedd v. State, 855 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Hettick v. State, 977 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
- Darby Houser v. State, 901 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Heath v. State, 968 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)