MICHAEL L. HETTICK, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2008-04-04
No. 2D07-3792
CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
977 So. 2d 797 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 19 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Hettick appealed the denial of his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence, claiming his concurrent sentences exceeded his negotiated plea agreement's "83 mos FSP cap concurrent" provision. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that while the sentence itself was not illegal, the postconviction court should have considered the motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 rather than 3.800(a), and the court's analysis of the plea agreement was flawed.


Holding

The court held that while Mr. Hettick's sentence was not illegal under rule 3.800(a), the postconviction court should have treated the motion as filed under rule 3.850 because it essentially claimed the trial court violated the negotiated plea agreement, rendering the plea involuntary. The court also held the postconviction court's analysis was flawed because a defendant's understanding of plea consequences cannot be determined solely from a document's silence regarding particular terms.


Headnotes

[1] A claim that a trial court violated the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, rendering the plea involuntary, is cognizable under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850…

[2] A postconviction court should treat a motion to correct an illegal sentence as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850 when the claim alleges a violation of a…

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Key Quotes

“the thrust of Mr. Hettick's claim is that the trial court violated the terms of his negotiated plea agreement, rendering his plea involuntary. Properly pleaded, this type of claim is cognizable under rule 3.850.”

Establishes that claims based on plea agreement violations belong under rule 3.850, not 3.800(a)

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Facts & Procedural History

Mr. Hettick was sentenced to concurrent terms totaling 120 months: 60 months in prison, followed by 2 years of community control and 3 years of drug o…

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Opinion of the Court
STRINGER, Judge.

STRINGER, Judge.

Michael L. Hettick appeals the summary denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Although Mr. Hettick’s sentence is not illegal, we reverse and remand because the postcon-viction court should have considered his motion as if it were filed pursuant to rule 3.850.

Mr. Hettick’s single claim alleges that the aggregate of his concurrent sentences in three separate cases exceeded a negotiated plea of “83 mos FSP cap concurrent,” as reflected on the written plea form. Mr. Hettick was actually sentenced to concurrent terms totaling 120 months: 60 months in prison, followed by 2 years of community control and 3 years of drug offender probation. In his motion, Mr. Hettick asked the postconviction court to correct his erroneous sentences by resentencing him to concurrent terms totaling no more than 83 months.

The postconviction court denied the motion because the 60-month incarcerative portion of Mr. Hettick’s concurrent sentences did not conflict with the written plea agreement’s limitation of the prison term to 83 months. The postconviction court also found that Mr. Hettick did not allege and the written plea form did not reflect any agreements as to the length of postincarcerative supervision; therefore, the sentences did not violate the terms of his negotiated plea.

There are two problems with the postconviction court’s order. First, the postconviction court should have recognized that Mr. Hettick’s claim was not cognizable pursuant to rule 3.800(a). The thrust of Mr. Hettick’s claim is that the trial court violated the terms of his negotiated plea agreement, rendering his plea involuntary. Properly pleaded, this type of claim is cognizable under rule 3.850. See Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Lawson, J., concurring specially) (observing that because there is no procedure in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure for a “motion to enforce plea agreement,” the only avenue available to the movant is to file a claim pursuant to rule 3.850). Because the motion was properly sworn and was filed within the time limitations of that rule, the postconviction court should have treated it as such. See Riviere v. State, 965 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Second, the postconviction court’s reasons for rejecting Mr. Hettick’s claim were flawed. The postconviction court essentially concluded that the silence of the plea agreement as to the length of postin-carcerative supervision meant that the court was free to impose community control and drug offender probation of any length. Generally, however, a defendant’s understanding of the significance and consequences of his or her plea cannot be determined solely from the document’s silence as to a particular term. See, e.g., Green v. Dugger, 575 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (remanding for the court to re-examine the record to determine whether the defendant’s plea agreement was violated by the addition of probation to his sentence and observing that an evidentiary hearing might be required); Eggers v. State, 624 So. 2d 336, 337-38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (holding that a trial court must inform the defendant that the prison term specified in the plea agreement will be followed by a probationary term, if that is the court’s intent).

In this case, however, any determination on the merits of Mr. Hettick’s specific claim would be premature as the postcon-viction court has not had the opportunity to consider it as filed under rule 3.850. We therefore reverse the postconviction court’s order and remand for reconsideration under rule 3.850. If the postconviction court determines that the motion is facially insufficient, it must grant Mr. Het-tick one opportunity to correct any plead ing deficiency. See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2007). If the court summarily denies the motion, it must attach to its order portions of the record conclusively refuting the claim.

Reversed and remanded.

CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ., Concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sweet v. State, 987 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …dismissed this claim on the ground that it could not be properly addressed in a rule 3.800(a) motion. Because there is no procedure for a “motion to enforce a plea agreement,” this claim must be filed pursuant to rule 3.850. See Hettick v. State, 977 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quoting Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)). Sweet’s sentence is the product of a negotiated plea agreement and, although he is only trying to correct his sentence, withdrawal of his plea is a potential c…
  • Almodovar v. State, 56 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
    …ee County- This court has observed on several occasions that the only avenue for enforcement of a plea agreement is through Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 51 So. 3d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Hettick v. State, 977 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Had Mr. Almo-dovar’s motion been properly sworn, the postconviction court could have considered it as a timely rule 3.850 motion. See Pifer v. State, 8 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Since it was not sworn, however, we must reve…
  • Pifer v. State, 8 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
    …Pifer’s motion were construed as a motion to withdraw plea, it would be denied as untimely. [*1155] Pifer’s claim that his sentence exceeds the terms of his plea agreement is facially sufficient and cognizable under rule 8.850. See Hettick v. State, 977 So. 2d 797, 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Lawson, J., concurring specially) (observing that because there is no procedure in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure for a “motion to enforce plea agr…

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