J.C., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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J.C., a juvenile, appeals her adjudication in a delinquency proceeding, contending she was denied the right to make the final closing argument as required by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(d). The State conceded error, and the court reversed and remanded for a procedurally sufficient closing argument before the same judge.
The court held that J.C. was improperly denied the opportunity to make her concluding closing argument. Because the error was procedural rather than substantive, a limited remand for a procedurally sufficient closing argument is the appropriate remedy, provided the original judge is available.
[1] A juvenile defendant is entitled to make the concluding closing argument in an adjudicatory hearing.
[2] A procedural error in a juvenile adjudicatory hearing may be remedied by a limited remand for a procedurally sufficient closing argument, provided the original judge is a…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Defendant/Appellant, J.C., appeals her disposition of guilt in a juvenile proceeding, contending that she was not afforded the opportunity — pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(d) — to make the concluding closing argument in her adjudicatory hearing.”
Establishes the core procedural violation at issue in the appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.C. was adjudicated in a juvenile proceeding. During the adjudicatory hearing, J.C. was not afforded the opportunity to make the concluding closing a…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant/Appellant, J.C., appeals her disposition of guilt in a juvenile proceeding, contending that she was not afforded the opportunity — pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(d) — to make the concluding closing argument in her adjudicatory hearing. On confession of error by the State, we reverse. See B.S. v. State, No. 3D07-2088 (Fla. 3d DCA July 16, 2008). Because the error in question was procedural, and not substantive, only a limited remand for a “procedurally sufficient closing” is necessary, so long as the judge who presided over the original adjudicatory hearing is available. See D.B. v. State, 979 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“[A]fter a procedurally sufficient closing, the judge’s reconsideration of the case will remedy the procedural violation. ...”).
Furthermore, we decline the invitation by Appellant to certify conflict in this case. See Art. V, § 3(b), Fla. Const. (“The supreme court ... [m]ay review any decision of a district court of appeal ... that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.”).
Appellant argues that two cases, E.K. v. State, 963 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), and C.H. v. State, 969 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), expressly and directly conflict with the limited remedy set in place by this Court in D.B. See D.B., 979 So. 2d at 1121.
We disagree. In C.H., the First District — after finding error where a juvenile division trial court allowed the State to proceed with the first and final closing argument — reversed and remanded the case “for further proceedings.” C.H., 969 So. 2d at 568. In E.K., the same court — in a materially identical procedural posture — remanded “for additional proceedings.” E.K., 963 So. 2d at 309. Neither opinion is clear as to whether “further proceedings” or “additional proceedings” meant new closing arguments or a new adjudicatory hearing.
Thus no “express” conflict exists between the cases that would require certification. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (“The dictionary definitions of the term ‘express’ include: ‘to represent in words’; ‘to give expression to.’ ‘Expressly’ is defined: ‘in an express manner.’ ”); Aravena v. Miami-Dade County, 928 So. 2d 1163, 1166-67 (Fla.2006) (allowing for conflict-based review of “irreconcilable” district court opinions); see also Paddock v. Chacko, 553 So. 2d 168, 168-69 (Fla.1989) (McDonald, J., concurring) (“[I]t is neither appropriate nor proper for us to review a record to find conflict ...; the opinion itself must directly and expressly, on its face, conflict with another opinion.”); Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986) (“Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish [conflict] jurisdiction.”).
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980)
- Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986)
- Aravena v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 928 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2006)
- Paddock v. Chawallur DeVassy Chacko, M.D., 553 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1989)
- E.K. a Child v. State, 963 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- C.H. v. State, 969 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- D.B. v. State, 979 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)