LORENZO ETIENNE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-10-29
No. 3D08-508
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and SUAREZ and SALTER, JJ.
994 So. 2d 450 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Lorenzo Etienne appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition, claiming that the forfeiture of gain time earned on a prior prison sentence violated the terms of his plea agreement. The court reversed, holding that while Etienne was not entitled to credit for all time previously served, the forfeiture of gain time thwarted the parties' agreed-upon sentence and warranted relief.


Holding

The court held that while a defendant is not entitled to credit for all time previously served (as that would result in an impermissible windfall), the forfeiture of gain time earned on an original sentence thwarts the parties' intended plea agreement when it extends the defendant's total sentence beyond what was agreed, entitling the defendant to relief.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is not entitled to credit for all previously served prison time when the transcript of the plea agreement explicitly limits the awarded credit.

[2] Forfeiture of previously earned gain time can thwart the intention of a plea agreement if it results in a sentence longer than agreed upon by the parties.

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Key Quotes

“the defendant is correct that the forfeiture of gain time earned on the original prison sentence thwarts the intention of the plea agreement”

Establishes the core holding that gain time forfeiture violates the plea agreement terms

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Facts & Procedural History

Etienne was sentenced to ten years in prison in 1997, plus five years probation. Released in 2003 after earning 880 days of gain time, he was arrested…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Lorenzo Etienne appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendant argues that the intention behind the plea agreement into which he entered was thwarted when he was not given credit for prison time previously served. We reverse the denial and remand with instructions.

In 1997, defendant was sentenced to ten years in prison, followed by five years of probation. He was released in 2003, having earned 880 days of gain time, and started the probationary portion of his sentence. He was arrested in 2007 on charges that he violated his probation. At the hearing, the court revoked defendant’s probation and imposed a four-year sentence with seventy days credit for jail time pending the hearing. The court announced, “you will serve three years and ten months in the state prison as a result of these charges.” There were no objections to this sentence.

Upon inquiring with the Department of Corrections about his presumptive release date, defendant was informed that his pri-or credit for prison time had been forfeited, and his release would be in six-and-a-half years. Thereafter, defendant sought habeas relief, asserting that he was entitled to the credit for time served and that the sentence he would serve violated the terms of the plea agreement. The court denied the habeas petition. Defendant appealed.

We agree with the State’s argument that defendant is not entitled to credit for all time previously served. The transcript shows that defendant pled to the seventy days of credit he was awarded. To award additional credit would mean that defendant would “receive the ‘windfall’ of immediate release.” Fulcher v. State, 875 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). This would be an absurd result. Rivera v. State, 954 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA), review granted, 968 So. 2d 557 (Fla.2007); Fulcher, 875 So. 2d at 648. However, the defendant is correct that the forfeiture of gain time earned on the original prison sentence thwarts the intention of the plea agreement. Here, as in Williams v. Department of Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the transcript shows that all parties to the plea agreement intended for defendant to serve just short of four years. The gain time forfeiture means defendant is facing a longer sentence than agreed. Defendant is entitled to relief on this basis. See Devoid v. State, 987 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); State v. Jackson, 842 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Dellahoy v. State, 816 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Wallace v. State, 793 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s denial of the habeas petition. We remand to the trial court with instructions that it treat the petition as a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion. The court shall either resentence defendant in a manner that effectuates the plea agreement in view of the gain time forfeiture, or allow defendant to withdraw his plea.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Chase v. State, 57 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
    …t can still effectuate the purpose of the plea agreement by either resentencing the appellant in a manner that will effectuate the plea agreement given the DOC’s forfeiture, or by allowing the appellant to withdraw from his plea”); Etienne v. State, 994 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (a defendant is entitled to have a plea agreement enforced if the DOC’s forfeiture of gain time thwarted the intent of a negotiated plea agreement); State v. Jackson, 842 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (although it is clear trial…
  • Ramos-Perez v. State, 99 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)
    …at. (2010). “However, a defendant is entitled to have a plea agreement enforced if the Department’s forfeiture of gain time thwarted the intent of a negotiated plea.” Chase v. State, 57 So. 3d 898, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); see also Etienne v. State, 994 So. 2d 450, 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). In this case, the forfeiture of the defendant’s gain time means the defendant will be facing a longer sentence than agreed, and thus, the defendant would be entitled to relief on this basis. We, therefore, reverse the tria…
  • Shadrick Crump v. State, 137 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
    …1269 (no mention of second case); Dellahoy, 816 So. 2d at 1253 (same); see also, Ramos-Perez v. State, 99 So. 3d 515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (plea after violation of probation); Chase v. State, 57 So. 3d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (same); Etienne v. State, 994 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (same); State v. Jackson, 842 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (same); Williams v. Dep’t of Corrections, 734 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (same). As these cases illustrate, when a defendant agrees to plead to charges in exchange f…

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