STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JADNIEL BURGOS, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2008-11-14
No. 5D08-1311
SAWAYA, J., and HARRIS, J.M., Associate Judge, concur.
994 So. 2d 1212 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State appeals a suppression order after police officers seized a concealed firearm from the defendant during a consensual encounter initiated by an anonymous tip. The court reversed the suppression order, holding that while the initial encounter was consensual and the anonymous tip alone could not justify a stop, the defendant's own admission of carrying the gun gave officers probable cause to seize it.


Holding

The court held that the initial approach and conversation constituted a lawful consensual encounter rather than a seizure. While an anonymous tip alone cannot justify a stop and frisk under prior precedent, the defendant's own admission during the consensual encounter that he was carrying a concealed gun gave the officers probable cause to seize the weapon. The officers did not rely on the tip to seize the gun but on the defendant's admission.


Headnotes

[1] A consensual encounter between police officers and an individual does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

[2] An individual's admission during a consensual encounter that they are carrying a concealed firearm provides probable cause for the seizure of the weapon.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The officers' decision to seize the weapon was the product of Appellee's admission during the consensual encounter that he was carrying a concealed gun.”

Establishes the critical distinction between relying on an anonymous tip versus relying on the defendant's own admission as the basis for seizure

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Police officers received an anonymous tip that the defendant had placed a gun in his waistband on a public street. The officers approached and engaged…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
TORPY, J.

TORPY, J.

The State appeals the final order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress a gun removed from his person during an encounter on a public street. The lower court concluded that police officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to seize the gun because they were acting on an anonymous tip. We conclude that the officers were properly engaged in a consensual encounter with Appellee when he admitted that he was carrying a concealed firearm, at which time the officers had probable cause to seize the weapon. We therefore reverse the order of suppression and remand this cause for further proceedings.

Acting on an anonymous tip that Appel-lee had been seen putting a gun in his waistband while walking on a public street, two police officers approached him and engaged him in conversation. During the conversation, one of the officers asked Ap-pellee whether he “had anything that’s going to hurt me or cause harm to me or anything like that.” When Appellee replied that he had a gun in his waistband, the officer instructed him to raise his hands. The officers then retrieved the gun, which had been fully concealed under Appellee’s shirt. After the officers confirmed that Appellee did not have a permit, they arrested him for carrying a concealed firearm.

The lower court determined, and we agree, that the initial approach and conversation was a “consensual encounter” rather than a seizure. Nevertheless, the lower court suppressed the evidence believing that this conclusion was compelled by J.L. v. State, 727 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1998). We find J.L. distinguishable from this case. Both cases involved anonymous tips. However, instead of merely engaging the defendant in a consensual encounter, as the officers did in the instant case, the officers in J.L. immediately accosted and frisked J.L. without his consent. The court held that the tip did not supply reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and frisk. Here, the officers did not rely on the tip to seize the gun. The officers’ decision to seize the weapon was the product of Appellee’s admission during the con sensual encounter that he was carrying a concealed gun.

Although not cited by either party, the distinction we make today is supported by language in a recent decision of our high court. In Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 2008 WL 4240489 (Fla. Sept. 18, 2008), the supreme court held:

Our holding today should not be interpreted to imply that, upon receipt of an anonymous call that someone has publicly waved a firearm, officers cannot or should not respond or approach that individual to further investigate the allegation and the circumstances. Rather, we merely hold that when investigating an anonymous tip, officers who are unable to independently corroborate criminal activity may not initiate a gunpoint seizure based upon confirmation of only innocent details-such as a physical description-with absolutely no observation or development of any suspicious behavior. In the instant case, the officers could have approached Baptiste and engaged him in conversation in an attempt to investigate the tip, and this conduct would not have violated the Fourth Amendment.

(internal citations omitted).

We also reject Appellee’s alternative argument that his admission that he was carrying the firearm did not support a reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime. Although some citizens do have the right to carry concealed firearms lawfully, the vast majority do not. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause are based on probabilities, not absolute certainty. State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). It is not necessary that police allow an individual to continue in possession of a firearm while they confirm the suspected crime to an absolute certainty.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA, J., and HARRIS, J.M., Associate Judge, concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Landi v. State, 68 So. 3d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Burgos, 994 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Aguilar v. State, 700 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); State v. Navarro, 464 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see also, U.S. v. Montague, Slip Op., 2010 WL 3294283 (S.D.Fla. Aug. 20, 2010); but cf. Regalado v. State, 25 So. 3d 600 (…
  • State v. Laina, 175 So. 3d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)
    …light of the officer’s knowledge. Id. at 300-01 (quoting State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)). Significant to this analysis, “[rjeasonable suspicion ... [is] based on probabilities, not absolute certainty.” State v. Burgos, 994 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citing State v. Jones, 417 So. 2d 788, 793 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (explaining that “[t]he word probable means it is ‘more likely than not’ that a particular categorical statement or proposition is, or will be, true or that a…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw