JOYCE R. MILES-YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STAFF MANAGEMENT SOLUTION, INC. AND GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., APPELLEES
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A fee awarded under section 440.34 must be reasonable, determined by statutory factors, not solely by a percentage guideline.
The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarded a fee based on a statutory guideline because the petition for benefits was not for medical benefits onl…
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Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) awarding a fee in accordance with the statutory fee guideline set forth in section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. We reverse.
The JCC correctly found the petition for benefits was not for medical benefits only. As a result, the JCC felt constrained to award as a fee a percentage of the benefits obtained, in accordance with the statutory guideline. At that time, the JCC did not have the benefit of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So.2d 1051 (Fla.2008). Murray teaches that the word “reasonable,” as used in section 440.34, means a fee amount must be determined subject to the factors set forth in Lee Engineering & Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968).
Here, the entitlement to a fee was not contested, and the evidence concerning the Lee Engineering factors indicates a reasonable fee is $750.00. Consequently, we REVERSE the JCC’s order and REMAND for an award in that amount.
KAHN and BROWNING, JJ., concur.
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Debord v. State, 152 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…s, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not procedurally prejudiced by the State’s discovery violation. See Henry v. State, 42 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Curry v. State, 1 So. 3d 394, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). In view of this result, we need not address Appellant’s other argument. REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial. BENTON, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.…
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Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gray v. Attorney Gen., State of Fla. and/or State Attorney, Cir. Court, Volusia Cnty., Fla., 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1968)
- Murray v. Mariner Health and ACE USA, 994 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 2008)