RYAN DEBORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ryan DeBord appeals his convictions for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present testimony from expert witnesses who were not properly designated in discovery. The appellate court agrees and reverses, finding the State violated discovery rules and the trial court failed to conduct an adequate hearing or properly analyze harmlessness.
The trial court abused its discretion by summarily deciding the State's discovery violation was harmless and technical. The State's discovery violation was not harmless because there was a reasonable possibility that DeBord's trial preparation and strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred, satisfying the extraordinarily high bar for excusing State discovery violations.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by allowing the testimony of undesignated expert witnesses when the State violates discovery rules.
[2] A discovery violation by the State is presumed to cause procedural prejudice to the defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant's trial preparation…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[W]here the State commits a discovery violation, the standard for deeming the violation harmless is extraordinarily high. A defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced "if there is a reasonable [possibility] that the defendant's trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred."”
Establishes the legal standard that governs review of State discovery violations and defines the high bar for harmlessness analysis
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State presented testimony from two expert witnesses at trial who had not been designated in discovery as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Proc…
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Appellant, Ryan DeBord, appeals his judgments and sentences for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation on grounds that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony of two undesignated expert witnesses for the State. We agree, and reverse and remand for a new trial.
Everyone agrees in this case that the State violated Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 by not designating its expert witnesses in discovery. The parties also agree that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Richardson hearing. We conclude that the trial court also abused its discretion by deciding summarily that the State’s discovery violation was a harmless, technical one. The Florida Supreme Court has established a very high bar for excusing discovery violations by the State:
[Wjhere the State commits a discovery violation, the standard for deeming the violation harmless is extraordinarily high. A defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced “if there is a reasonable [possibility] that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.”
Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 712 (Fla.2002) (quoting State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016, 1020 (Fla.1995)); see also Scipio v. State, 928 So.2d 1138, 1149-50 (Fla.2006). In this ease, there seems a reasonable possibility that Appellant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy had the State disclosed its intent to obtain expert testimony from these witnesses prior to the eve of trial. In fact, Appellant’s counsel told the trial court that he would have deposed both expert witnesses and possibly procured his own expert. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not procedurally prejudiced by the State’s discovery violation. See Henry v. State, 42 So.3d 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial. See Curry v. State, 1 So.3d 394, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). In view of this result, we need not address Appellant’s other argument.
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
BENTON, CLARK, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Bess v. State, 208 So. 3d 1213 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…designating a detective as an expert was not harmless, even though detective’s testimony was brief; appellate court could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery violation); Debord v. State, 152 So. 3d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that the State’s failure to designate its expert witnesses was not harmless in trial for sexual battery and lewd and lascivious molestation where it was reasonably possible that defendant would have altered his trial pre…
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Millette v. State, 223 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…e concedes there was a discovery violation. The only issue left is whether there was prejudice that requires a new trial. On this score, we have previously noted the “very high bar” for excusing the State’s discovery violations. See Debord v. State, 152 So. 3d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). Courts will find procedural prejudice “if there is a reasonable possibility that ’ the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred.” State v. Schopp, 653 So.…
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Wilson v. State, 261 So. 3d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…rdinary high. A defendant is presumed to be procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable [probability] that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy would have been materially different had the violation not occurred. Debord v. State, 152 So. 3d 788, 789 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 5 In the instant case, there exists a reasonable probability Appellant would have altered his trial preparation or strategy had the State disclosed its intent to utilize e…1 / 2
Authorities Cited
- State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1995)
- COX v. State, 819 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2002)
- Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006)
- Curry v. State, 1 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Miles-Young v. Staff Mgmt. Solution, Inc., 1 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
- Astor Burpee Henry v. State, 42 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)