M.A.M., PETITIONER,
v.
VINCENT VURRO, AS SUPERINTENDENT OF THE SOUTHWEST FLORIDA JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, RESPONDENT
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M.A.M., a juvenile charged with misdemeanor domestic violence battery, sought habeas corpus relief from secure detention. The court held that Florida law limits secure detention to a total of 21 days from the first court detention hearing, and M.A.M.'s detention beyond that period was illegal.
Sections 985.255(2) and 985.26(2) of Florida law prohibit holding a child in secure detention for more than 21 days in total on the same offense. The 21-day clock begins on the day of the first detention hearing, and the maximum does not include the initial 24 hours of custody prior to that hearing. M.A.M. was entitled to release on day 21, October 29.
[1] A child may not be held in secure detention for more than a total of twenty-one days under relevant statutory provisions.
[2] The twenty-one-day maximum for secure detention does not include the initial twenty-four hours a child may be held in custody by a juvenile probation officer prior to a d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The child may not be held in secure detention under this subsection for more than 48 hours unless ordered by the court. After 48 hours, the court shall hold a hearing if the state attorney or victim requests that secure detention be continued.”
Establishes the 48-hour limit on initial secure detention under section 985.255(2)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceM.A.M. was arrested on October 8, 2008, for misdemeanor battery on a family member and placed in secure detention. A detention hearing was held on Oct…
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M.A.M., a juvenile, filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking to be discharged from secure detention. By prior unpublished order, we granted the petition and advised that this opinion would follow to explain our reasoning. We conclude that, under the relevant statutory provisions, M.A.M. could not legally be held in secure detention for more than a total of twenty-one days.
On October 8, 2008, M.A.M. was charged with misdemeanor battery on a family member. Upon arrest, M.A.M. was placed in secure detention by a juvenile probation officer (“JPO”). A “Juvenile Delinquency Minutes/Order” reflects that a detention hearing was held on October 9, and M.A.M. was ordered to be held in secure detention for two days beginning on October 9 and “pending next 48-hour review.” Apparently, there was a second hearing on October 11, at which M.A.M. was ordered to remain in secure detention for another forty-eight hours; however, no copy of an order dated October 11 was included with M.A.M.’s petition. Then, at a third hearing on October 13, M.A.M. was ordered to be held in secure detention for twenty-one days beginning on October 13. This order indicates that an arraignment was scheduled for November 4, 2008.
In his emergency petition, M.A.M. alleged that he was being illegally held in secure detention because the relevant statutes limit secure detention to a total of twenty-one days, not two forty-eight-hour periods followed by twenty-one days. We agree.
Under the statutory provisions concerning juvenile detention, a child is taken into initial custody by a JPO. See § 985.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The JPO determines the appropriate type of detention for the child, which can range from secure detention to home detention, based on factors outlined in a statutorily mandated risk assessment *390instrument. See § 985.245, .25(l)(a), (b). The child must be given a detention hearing within twenty-four hours of being taken into custody. § 985.255(3)(a). When, as here, the child has been charged with committing an act of domestic violence that does not otherwise meet the secure detention criteria, the child may continue to be held in secure detention only if the court makes “specific written findings” that respite care is unavailable and that secure detention is required to prevent victim injury.1 § 985.255(2). However,
[t]he child may not be held in secure detention under this subsection for more than 48 hours unless ordered by the court. After 48 hours, the court shall hold a hearing if the state attorney or victim requests that secure detention be continued. The child may continue to be held in detention care if the court makes a specific, written finding that detention care is necessary to protect the victim from injury. However, the child may not be held in detention care beyond the time limits set forth in this section or s. 985.26.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 985.26(2) provides that “[a] child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing for the case has been commenced in good faith by the court.”
We conclude that sections 985.255(2) and 985.26(2) clearly prohibit the trial court from ordering that a child charged with domestic violence be held in secure detention for more than twenty-one days in total. See A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (“[A] juvenile cannot be detained for longer than twenty-one days on the same offense.”); T.O. v. Alachua Reg’l Juvenile Detention Ctr., 668 So.2d 243, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA) (holding that juvenile’s detention was illegal when he had been held in secure detention for more than twenty-one days with no adjudicatory hearing and no motion to continue from the State), ajfd on other grounds, 684 So.2d 814 (Fla.1996). However, we also conclude that the twenty-one-day maximum does not include the initial twenty-four hours under which the child may be placed in custody at the JPO’s discretion prior to the detention hearing. See § 985.26(2) (“A child may not be held in ... detention care under a special detention order for more than 21 days ....” (emphasis added)); § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (holding that penal statutes “shall be strictly construed” and that any ambiguities “shall be construed most favorably to the accused”); see also A.M.P. v. State, 927 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (applying rule of lenity in section 775.021(1) in juvenile case); G.S. v. State, 761 So.2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (applying strict construction provision of section 775.021(1) in juvenile case).
Here, the twenty-one-day clock on M.A.M.’s detention began running on October 9, the day on which M.A.M. was first brought into court for a detention hearing. Because no motion to continue was filed by the State and no adjudicatory hearing was commenced, M.A.M. was entitled to be released on day twenty-one, that is, October 29, the day we issued our order granting the emergency petition for writ of ha-*391beas corpus.2 Any detention after that date would have been illegal.
Petition granted.
STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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M.D.E. v. State, 206 So. 3d 152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)…he twenty-one days should be counted such that the first day of detention under a court order ... is included in the count. This method of counting ensures that a child is not held in detention more than the imposed number of days.” M.A.M. v. Vurro, 2 So. 3d 388, 390, 391 n.2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). While Petitioner was taken into custody on November 18, 2016, the detention order was entered on November 19, 2016. Including the first day of detention under court order in the 21 day calculation, but not the initi…
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J.J. v. State, 181 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…ns of th[e] [Florida Criminal] [C]ode and offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the language is susceptible, of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.”); see also M.A.M. v. Vurro, 2 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (strictly construing a juvenile delinquency statute). Accordingly, we reverse the withhold of adjudication for introduction of a firearm into a detention facility. III. THE COST OF PROSECUTION Concerning the $100 cost of prosecu…
Authorities Cited
- Alachua Reg'l Juv. Detention Ctr. v. T.O., 684 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1996)
- A.M.P. v. State, 927 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- State v. R.F., 648 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Philpot v. State, 668 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- G.S. v. State, 761 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)