JAY ALAN MYERS, APPELLANT,
v.
JIM RUSSO PRISON MINISTRIES, INC., JEAN FRENCH RUSSO, CHAIRPERSON, AND DAVID GRAY, DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 2009-02-06
No. 2D08-1744
NORTHCUTT, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., Concur.
3 So. 3d 411 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Jay Alan Myers appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims against Jim Russo Prison Ministries for gross negligence, breach of contract, defamation, and slander. The court affirmed the dismissal of most claims but reversed the slander claim, holding that statements falsely accusing Myers of theft constitute slander per se for which nominal damages are recoverable, at least as to statements made to certain parties.


Holding

The court reversed summary judgment on the slander claim as to statements made to the hospital, employer, residential facility, mother, and girlfriend. Statements falsely accusing someone of committing a crime are actionable per se, entitling the plaintiff to at least nominal damages even without proof of actual monetary damages. Statements to police and probation officers qualified for absolute or qualified privilege.


Headnotes

[1] Defamatory statements made to police or a state's attorney prior to the institution of criminal charges are qualifiedly privileged if they relate to the subject of the in…

[2] A jury may award nominal damages for slander actionable per se, even in the absence of proof of actual monetary damages.

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Key Quotes

“One who is liable for a slander actionable per se or for a libel is liable for at least nominal damages.”

Establishes that nominal damages are recoverable for slander per se even without proof of actual monetary damages

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Facts & Procedural History

Myers was released from prison and spent three months at a Russo facility for life skills training and substance abuse recovery. A Russo employee alle…

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Opinion of the Court
LaROSE, Judge.

LaROSE, Judge.

Jay Alan Myers appeals a final summary judgment entered in favor of Jim Russo Prison Ministries, Inc. (Russo). Upon release from prison, Mr. Myers began a three-month stay at a Russo facility that provided life skills training and substance abuse recovery under DOC supervision. Mr. Myers sued Russo for gross negligence, breach of contract, defamation, and slander arising from Mr. Myers’ stay at the facility. We are compelled to reverse as to the slander claim. We affirm as to all other issues without further discussion.

Mr. Myers alleged that a Russo employee slandered him by telling the police, his probation officer, his employer, the staff of his new residential facility, a hospital, his mother, and his girlfriend that he stole a television set and VCR from Russo. Mr. Myers claims that these statements were false. Allegedly, Russo’s house manager reported the theft to the police. No evidence was found, no charges were filed, and the police, Russo, and its insurer did not pursue the matter.

The trial court properly ruled that the alleged statements to the police and the probation officer were qualifiedly privileged. See Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 69 (Fla.1992) (holding that defamatory statements that private individuals made to police or state’s attorney prior to institution of criminal charges are quali-fiedly privileged where statements relate to subject of investigation and not made with express intent to injure reputation).

The trial court also ruled that Mr. Myers suffered no damages because the police did not arrest him, the hospital did not refuse to treat him, his employer did not fire him, the new residential facility allowed him to stay, his probation officer did not violate him, and his relationships with his mother and girlfriend did not change. Mr. Myers argues that the alleged slander caused those who heard it to treat him with extreme scrutiny and caused him to suffer mental anguish, fear, anxiety, and stress.

Even if Mr. Myers’ evidence failed to prove actual money damages, a jury could find Russo liable for nominal damages. “One who is liable for a slander actionable per se or for a libel is liable for at least nominal damages.” Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan, 629 So.2d 113, 116 n. 4 (Fla.1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977)). Spoken words falsely stating that another committed a criminal offense are actionable per se. LeGrande v. Emmanuel, 889 So.2d 991, 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Therefore, as it relates to the statements allegedly made to the hospital, the employer, the new residential facility, the mother, and the girlfriend, we reverse the summary judgment as to the slander claim.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., Concur.


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  • Lawnwood Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Samuel H. Sadow, M.D., 43 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …Kupfer P.A. v. Flanagan, 629 So. 2d 113, 116 n. 4 (Fla.1994) (quoting Restatement (Seoond) of Torts § 558: “one who is liable for a slander actionable per se ... ' is liable for at least nominal damages.”); Myers v. Jim Russo Prison Ministries Inc., 3 So. 3d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (same); 19A Fla. Jur.2d Defamation and Privacy, § 133. If the jury finds defendant liable for slander per se, it must be instructed that nominal damages are deemed established as a matter of law. It is error to instruct instead th…
  • Valladares v. Bank OF Am. Corp., 197 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016)
    ….1986) (holding that a company was not liable for malicious prosecution when an employee, in good faith and without specifically requesting arrest, reported suspected criminal activity to law enforcement); Myers v. Jim Russo Prison Ministries, Inc., 3 So. 3d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (applying the qualified privilege to slander arising from false reports made to police); Harris v. Kearney, 786 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reasoning under Pokomy that there was no false imprisonment claim against…
  • Bank OF Am. Corp. v. Valladares, 141 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
    …dovich, 598 So. 2d at 69 (adopting a qualified privilege for defamatory statements voluntarily made to police). A mistaken report to the police rises to the level of slander only if it is done with malice. Myers v. Jim Russo Prison Ministries, Inc., 3 So. 3d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (recognizing a qualified privilege attaches to slanderous statements made to police). A mistaken report to the police that leads to a false arrest rises to the level of a tort only if the reporting person acted with malice or…

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