WILLIAM REDDIX, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a finding of violation of probation (VOP) because the State's case relied entirely on inadmissible hearsay testimony. The court held that while hearsay may be admitted in VOP proceedings, it cannot constitute the sole basis for revoking probation.
No. The court held that while hearsay is ordinarily admissible in VOP proceedings, it cannot constitute the sole basis for finding a violation of probation. To prove a willful, substantial VOP, the State must introduce admissible evidence, either the actual Program chart through the business record exception or testimony from someone with personal knowledge of the alleged infractions.
[1] Hearsay evidence may be admitted in probation violation proceedings but cannot be the sole basis for finding a violation.
[2] A finding of willful violation of probation requires admissible evidence, not solely hearsay testimony.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While hearsay ordinarily inadmissible in a criminal trial may be admitted in VOP proceedings, it may not constitute the sole basis for finding a violation of probation.”
Establishes the fundamental principle governing admissibility of hearsay evidence in violation of probation cases
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceReddix was charged with violating the rules of a residential treatment program where he was required to reside as part of his probation. The Program d…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Personal Knowledge Requirement For Testimony cases and more on FLexlaw
Defendant argues that the finding of violation of probation (VOP) is entirely based on hearsay evidence. We agree.
His VOP charge concerned alleged infractions of the rules in a residential treatment program (Program). The Program director testified for the State. He did not have defendant’s files as he testified. Instead, he testified that he spoke with defendant’s supervisor before appearing in court. The supervisor went through the chart with the director. Critical to the testimony was a behavior contract the Program had insisted defendant sign and perform in order to continue in the program after some previous rule infractions. Again, this contract was not presented in court. The director did not himself supervise defendant’s participation in the Program or make the entries in defendant’s Program chart and thus did not testify from personal knowledge.
It is well settled that in order to revoke probation the State must prove by a greater weight of the evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, that the probationer deliberately, willfully, and substantially violated one or more conditions of probation. Steiner v. State, 604 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Blackshear v. State, 771 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). While hearsay ordinarily inadmissible in a criminal trial may be admitted in VOP proceedings, it may not constitute the sole basis for finding a violation of probation. Thomas v. State, 711 So.2d 96, 97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Such hearsay evidence may be used only to combine with admissible evidence establishing the violation. Thomas, 711 So.2d at 97.
Defendant argues that in order to prove a willful, substantial VOP in this setting, the State was required to adduce his actual Program chart into evidence through the business record exception or offer testimony directly from someone who actually witnessed the alleged Program infractions. This argument has been accepted in our own decision in Bertoloti v. State, 831 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), and by the First District in Stewart v. State, 926 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
In Bertoloti, The trial court had revoked defendant’s probation because of failure to complete a drug treatment program. The only evidence of a willful violation was the *329testimony of the drug treatment program’s records custodian, in which he stated that the chart showed that defendant tested positive for alcohol. We found the testimony of the records custodian insufficient to prove a VOP under nearly identical circumstances. We reversed the VOP because the defendant’s chart was not introduced into evidence.
Similarly in Stewart, defendant argued the court improperly relied exclusively on inadmissible hearsay in finding that he willfully violated community control. At the revocation hearing, the director of the program testified that the defendant was discharged from the program for refusing to leave the building during a fire drill and being involved in verbal altercations with other residents. The court reversed the VOP because, although there was competent evidence that the defendant was expelled from the program, the only evidence that his conduct was willful and substantial came from the director’s hearsay testimony.
In this case, all of the conduct described by the Program director as infractions of Program rules came from entries in defendant’s chart by someone else. The director did not have personal knowledge of any of the incidents.
Because Florida law requires admissible evidence to support a finding of a willful VOP, the State was required to produce defendant’s chart at the hearing and seek its admission into evidence. Otherwise, it needed a witness having personal knowledge of the pm-ported infractions. It follows that the finding of VOP is not supported by the evidence.
Reversed.
GROSS, C.J., and POLEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hodge v. Cichon, 79 So. 3d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)…al summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. See Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Under these circumstances, we must also reverse the fee award entered in Appellees’ favor. See Hickman v. Barclay’s Int'l Realty, Inc., 12 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reversing order granting attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 where appellate court reversed trial court’s order granting final summary judgment in favor of appellees); City of Hollywood v. Witt, 939 So. 2d 315, 319 (Fla.…
-
Graney v. Caduceus Props., LLC, 93 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…D. We have since reversed the final judgment. See Graney v. Caduceus Props., LLC, 91 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). We now reverse the trial court’s award of costs and fees entered in appellees’ favor. See Hickman v. Barclay’s Int’l Realty, Inc., 12 So. 3d 327, 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (reversing order granting attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 where appellate court reversed trial court’s order granting final summary judgment in favor of appellees); City of Hollywood v. Witt, 939 So. 2d 315, 319 (…
-
Vose v. Gulfside Constr. Servs., Inc., 38 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ded for further proceedings, see Vose v. Gulfside Constr. Servs., Inc., 12 So. 3d 322, 323-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), we also reverse the attorney’s fees and costs judgment and remand for further proceedings. See Hickman v. Barclay’s Int’l Realty, Inc., 12 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). If the prevailing party determination is altered on remand, the trial court should reconsider the amount of fees awarded. See Bd. of Regents v. Winters, 918 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that a determination of the…
Authorities Cited
- Steiner v. State, 604 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Stewart v. State, 926 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Blackshear v. State, 771 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Bertoloti v. State, 831 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)