BILLY KENNETH LEWIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to sentence Billy Kenneth Lewis as a habitual felony offender (HFO) after he violated probation. The court found that the record clearly showed Lewis was originally sentenced as an HFO, allowing for HFO sentences upon probation violation.
Yes, a defendant can be sentenced as a habitual felony offender (HFO) upon violation of probation if the original sentences imposed were HFO sentences, even if not explicitly stated as such during the initial oral pronouncement.
[1] A defendant may be sentenced as a habitual felony offender upon violation of probation if the original sentences imposed were habitual felony offender sentences.
[2] A trial court's intent to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender can be demonstrated by the sentencing hearing transcript, written findings, and written sente…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding, and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender. “Magic words” are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.”
This quote from a prior case, adopted by the court, establishes that explicit "magic words" are not required to show intent to sentence as a habitual felony offender if other evidence, like written documents and plea colloquies, supports that intent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBilly Kenneth Lewis was sentenced to concurrent life sentences as a habitual felony offender (HFO) after violating probation. Lewis argued he could no…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Probation Violation Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
Billy Kenneth Lewis appeals from concurrent life sentences, imposed as habitual felony offender (“HFO”) sentences, after Lewis violated his probation. Lewis argues that he could not be sentenced as an HFO upon his violation of probation because he was not originally sentenced as an HFO on these charges. See King v. State, 681 So.2d 1136 (Fla.1996). Having independently reviewed the record, we agree with the State that the transcript of the sentencing hearing, together with the written sentences, clearly demonstrate that the trial court intended to, and did, sentence Lewis as an HFO when the original probationary sentences were imposed. See, e.g., Zink v. State, 943 So.2d 895, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“ ‘Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding, and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender. *1022“Magic words” are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.’ ”) (quoting Scanes v. State, 876 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 892 So.2d 1014 (Fla.2004)).
With respect to the first charge, the trial court said: “[T]he Court adjudicates you as a habitual felony offender today.” Although the court did not also expressly state that the first sentence was being imposed as an HFO sentence, the written sentence clarifies that the defendant was “adjudicated a habitual felony offender and has been sentenced ... in accordance with the provisions of section 775.084(4)(a), Florida Statutes.” Additionally, immediately after oral pronouncement of the first sentence, the trial judge pronounced sentence on the second charge, expressly stating that Lewis was “also being sentenced as a habitual felony offender” on the second charge. (Emphasis added). Because the record reflects that Lewis was given HFO sentences when he was originally placed on probation, the trial court had the discretion to impose HFO sentences upon revocation of Lewis’ probation. Cf. King, 681 So.2d at 1140.
AFFIRMED.
MONACO, C.J., LAWSON and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Stauderman v. State, 261 So. 3d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…ce exceeded what the trial court could impose for a non-HFO sentence, the ten-year sentence was illegal, and Stauderman was entitled to resentencing. The concurrence's reliance on O'Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), Lewis v. State, 16 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), and Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), to conclude to the contrary is misplaced. First, in light of Akins, we cannot agree that O'Neal, to the extent that it held that a circuit court need not make a speci…1 / 2
-
Deleon Brownlee v. State (Fla. 3d DCA 2023)…tence. Thereafter, the state withdrew its ---PAGE 7--- stipulation and contended that no “magic words” were needed if it was clear from the record that the court intended to sentence Brownlee as a habitual offender, relying upon Lewis v. State, 16 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Zink v. State, 943 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); and Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The state asserted that a de novo resentencing was not needed because it was clear that the former judge’s failure…
Authorities Cited
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- State v. West, 892 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2005)
- Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Zink v. State, 943 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)