VINCENT SCANES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Scanes appealed a summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his thirty-year concurrent sentences for second-degree felonies exceeded the statutory maximum because the trial court failed to use specific language stating he was being sentenced "as" a habitual felony offender. The court affirmed, holding that the trial court's contemporaneous sentencing as a habitual felony offender was clear from the plea colloquy, written findings, and written sentence, and that no magic words are required.
The court held that the sentence was not illegal because the trial court clearly intended to and did contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender, as evidenced by the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender finding, and the written sentence. Magic words are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.
[1] A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence is sufficient to establish habitual offender status when the record, including written findings and the written sentence, c…
[2] "Magic words" are not required to establish a sentencing court's intent to impose a habitual offender sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Magic words are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.”
The court's holding that specific language formulations are not required to demonstrate a trial court's intent to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing a jury trial, Scanes was declared a habitual felony offender and sentenced concurrently to thirty years in prison on two second-degree felon…
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STONE, J.
We affirm an order summarily denying Scanes’ motion to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Following a jury trial, Scanes was declared a habitual felony offender and sentenced concurrently to thirty years in prison on two second-degree felonies.
Scanes contends that his thirty-year sentences exceed the appropriate statutory maximum for second-degree felonies because the trial court did not orally sentence him “as ” a habitual felony offender. Specifically, the court held him to be a habitual felony offender and concurrently sentenced him to the enhanced sentence, but did not state that the thirty-year sentences were imposed on Scanes “as” a habitual felony offender. The transcript reflects:
.... I declare and find the Defendant to be a habitual felony offender pursuant to Florida Statute 775.084.
The Court herein sentences the Defendant as to Count I and Count II each to thirty years in the Florida State Prison and to run concurrent and not consecutive to each other with credit for time served....
In Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012, 1015 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), this court held that the trial court’s clarification of sentence two days after oral pronouncement, to reflect the defendant’s habitual offender status, was a violation of the defendant’s double jeopardy rights and constituted reversible error. There, , the oral pronouncement clearly did not reflect the trial court’s intention to sentence Evans as a habitual offender, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court’s failure to include the habitual sentencing in its oral pronouncement may well have been an oversight. Id.
In Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla.2003), the trial court, three days after sentencing the defendant as a habitual felony offender, imposed a habitual violent felony offender sentence along with a mandatory minimum. There, the supreme court concluded that the later sentence was a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 1269.
Here, it is clear from the plea colloquy, the written habitual felony offender find ing, and the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender.1 “Magic words” are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended. See O’Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91, 91-92 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Yates v. State, 823 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), rev. denied, 842 So. 2d 848 (Fla.2003).
GUNTHER and STEVENSON, JJ„ concur. . We recognize that this court has declared that the only kinds of illegal sentence challenges cognizable under the rule “are those that are illegal because they exceed the maximum ..., those that were unconstitutionally increased after they had been imposed, ... those for which no record, earned jail credit was given,” Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), holding modified by Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and habitual sentencing imposed for an offense not subject to habitualization as a matter of law under any set of factual circumstances. See Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.2001). We consider the issue raised here to be a claim that the sentence was “unconstitutionally increased” after it was imposed. We also distinguish this claim from those asserting a discrepancy between the oral and written sentence, which must be alleged in a timely motion under rule 3.850. See Gardner v. State, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Zink v. State, 943 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ence order included that designation. However, the only way that the forty-year sentences could have been legally imposed would have been if they were habitual offender sentences. We have addressed a case involving similar facts in Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), rev. denied, 892 So. 2d 1014 (Fla.2004), also an appeal of an order denying rule 3.800(a) relief. There, as in this case, the trial court made oral findings that the defendant qualified as a habitual offender and imposed enhance…
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Akins v. State, 926 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…uble jeopardy issue in this proceeding. We express no opinion about whether Akins may be entitled to relief on that point. See Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.2003); Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). But see Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 892 So. 2d 1014 (Fla.2004). But this opinion is without prejudice to his right, if any, to raise this issue in a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Dismissed. SALCINES, J., and DANAHY,…
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Lewis v. State, 16 So. 3d 1021 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…the written sentence, that the trial court intended to, and did, contemporaneously sentence Scanes as a habitual felony offender. [*1022] “Magic words” are not necessary to establish what the sentencing court intended.’ ”) (quoting Scanes v. State, 876 So. 2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 892 So. 2d 1014 (Fla.2004)). With respect to the first charge, the trial court said: “[T]he Court adjudicates you as a habitual felony offender today.” Although the court did not also expressly state that the…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Columbus Rickey Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 2003)
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- O'Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
- Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Austin v. State, 756 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Yates v. State, 823 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- TIG Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Gardner v. State, 707 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)