RICHARD M. WHITE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court reversed a sentence where the trial court improperly delegated to the Department of Corrections the discretion to run sentences concurrently or consecutively, holding that only trial courts have sentencing authority.
A trial court cannot delegate sentencing discretion to the Department of Corrections, as executive branch agencies lack authority to structure sentences.
[1] A trial court cannot delegate sentencing discretion to the Department of Corrections or other executive branch agencies, which lack authority to make sentencing decisions…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWhile on parole, White was arrested for cocaine possession and pleaded guilty pursuant to an agreement. The trial court sentenced him to 24 months for…
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While on parole, the appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the appellant to 24 months’ imprisonment for possession of cocaine to run concurrently with his parole violation “at the discretion of the parole board.” In its discretion, the Department of Corrections chose to run the sentences consecutively. The appellant filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing that the trial court improperly delegated discretion to the Department of Corrections, which has no authority to make sentencing decisions. We agree.
Even if part of a negotiated plea agreement, a trial court cannot defer the structure of a sentence to the Department of Corrections because the executive branch agencies lack sentencing authority. See Richardson v. State, 947 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The State concedes error, but suggests that an evidentiary hearing *408may not be necessary if the State Attorney’s office has no objection to concurrent sentences. We accordingly reverse and remand with directions for the trial court either to hold an evidentiary hearing or to enter an amended judgment showing White’s sentences to be concurrent.
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with instructions.
WOLF, PADOVANO, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Widemond v. State, 27 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…ineffective assistance of counsel and an illegal sentence, we reverse and remand for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing or to impose the sentence in the instant case to be concurrent with the sentence imposed by DOC. See White v. State, 19 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). REVERSED and REMANDED. LEWIS, THOMAS and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Richardson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)