THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CEDRIC C. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2009-10-14
No. 3D08-1979
Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.
20 So. 3d 419 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2009) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The State appeals the trial court's sentencing of Williams for multiple burglary and theft offenses, arguing that the judge imposed a downward departure from habitual offender and prison releasee reoffender sentencing guidelines without providing required written reasons or proper designations. The appellate court agrees and reverses, finding the trial court violated statutory sentencing requirements.


Holding

The trial court erred in imposing downward departure sentences as a habitual offender without stating reasons for the departure, and in sentencing under the prison releasee reoffender statute without the proper designation and without giving the State an opportunity to present evidence establishing the defendant's release date. Statutory sentencing requirements mandate written reasons for downward departures and proper designations when such enhancements apply.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must state written reasons for a downward departure from sentencing guidelines when imposing a sentence more lenient than that required by the habitual offe…

[2] Sentencing a defendant as a prison releasee re-offender requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies, and the trial court must afford th…

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Key Quotes

“If a trial judge chooses to impose a sentence more lenient than that required by the habitual offender statute, the judge must state the appropriate reasons for the downward departure from the guidelines.”

Establishes the mandatory requirement that downward departures from habitual offender sentencing guidelines must be accompanied by stated reasons

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Facts & Procedural History

Williams entered non-negotiated guilty pleas to charges in two cases: burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, third-degree grand theft, criminal mischief,…

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Opinion of the Court
SUAREZ, J.

SUAREZ, J.

The State appeals a sentence in lower tribunal case no. 06-14093 for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, third-degree grand theft, criminal mischief, and resisting an officer without violence and a sentence in lower tribunal case no. 07-38131 for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and criminal mischief. The State alleges that the trial judge erroneously sentenced the defendant pursuant to habitual offender and prison releasee reoffender enhancements, but did not provide habitual offender or prison releasee designations or oral or written reasons for the sentence which constituted a downward departure from the guidelines. We agree and reverse.

The defendant entered into a non-negotiated plea. In case no. 06-14093, he pled guilty to burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, third-degree grand theft, criminal mischief and resisting an officer without violence. He was sentenced to five years of incarceration followed by two years of probation. In case number 07-38131, he pled guilty as part of the same non-negotiated plea, to charges of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and criminal mischief. He was sentenced to four years of incarceration followed by three years of probation to run concurrent with case no. 06-14093.

The State appeals the sentence on grounds that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to a downward departure as a habitual offender and prison releasee pursuant to a plea to the court without oral or written reasons. The State also contends that the sentence did not contain the habitual offender and prison releasee offender designation.

If a trial judge chooses to impose a sentence more lenient than that required by the habitual offender statute, the judge must state the appropriate reasons for the *421downward departure from the guidelines. State v. Rinkins, 646 So.2d 727 (Fla.1994).1

As a prison releasee re-offender, the statutory language of section 775.082(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (2008), provides that, upon proof from the State Attorney that establishes by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee offender, the defendant must be sentenced according to the statute and there is no discretion to impose a lesser sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Proof of the release date, evidence of which the trial court did not give the State an opportunity to present, is an essential element for sentencing pursuant to the prison releasee re-offender act. State v. Garcia, 923 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that trial court is required to afford State sufficient opportunity to present evidence on defendant’s qualification as prison release reoffender); Gray v. State, 910 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

As the defendant was sentenced to a lesser sentence under the habitual offender act without oral or written reasons for the downward departure, and as a prison releasee under the act without the re-offender designation,2 we reverse the trial court’s order and the cause is remanded for resentencing, to include written reasons for the departure and designations for habitual offender and prison releasee, or for withdrawal of the plea. See State v. Davis, 997 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) demanding for resentencing or withdrawal of the guilty plea absent valid reasons for downward departure sentence).

Reversed and remanded.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Jackson v. State, 64 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 2011)
    …ecision of the First District Court of Appeal in State v. Jackson, 22 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The First District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), State v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and State v. Berry, 976 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The case under review concerns the re-sentencing of Bradley Jame…
    1 / 3
  • State v. Jackson, 22 So. 3d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …rt may again impose a departure sentence, relying on several recent cases from the Third District permitting resentencing outside of the guidelines where a downwardly departing sentence is reversed for lack of written reasons. See State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding “for resentenc-ing, to include written reasons” for downward departure); State v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278, 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (reversing a downward departure sentence for lack of [*819] written reasons…
  • Glover v. State, 75 So. 3d 238 (Fla. 2011)
    …25 So. 3d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), in which the First District Court of Appeal reversed a downward departure sentence and remanded for sentencing within the statutory guidelines. Petitioner alleges express and direct conflict with State v. Williams, 20 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), State v. Davis, 997 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), and State v. Berry, 976 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We stayed proceedings in this case pending our disposition of J…

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