DAVID CRAIN GILLIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Gillis challenged the denial of his postconviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed the denial but clarified that the motion should have been denied as untimely rather than on the merits.
The postconviction motion was untimely and should have been denied on that basis. A resentencing resulting from successful rule 3.800 motions does not toll the two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion attacking convictions.
[1] A resentencing that results from a successful motion to correct an illegal sentence does not toll the time limit for filing a motion for postconviction relief.
[2] A motion for postconviction relief must be filed within two years after the conclusion of direct review proceedings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mr. Gillis's resentencing, which resulted not from his direct appeal but from his successful rule 3.800 motions, did not toll the two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion attacking his convictions.”
Establishes the key holding that rule 3.800 resentencing does not extend the deadline for rule 3.850 postconviction motions.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGillis was convicted in 2004 of robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated battery and sentenced to concurrent life terms and thirty years. He was not initia…
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David Crain Gillis challenges a final order summarily denying his motion for *682postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm the postconviction court’s order but write to clarify the appropriate basis for denial of Mr. Gillis’s motion.
In 2004, Mr. Gillis was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated battery and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison on the robbery and kidnapping charges and to thirty years in prison on the aggravated battery charge. At his original sentencing, Mr. Gillis was not designated as a habitual felony offender on any of the three charges. This court affirmed the judgment and sentence on appeal, and the mandate issued on March 24, 2005. Gillis v. State, 901 So.2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (table decision).
Mr. Gillis subsequently filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a). The motion was granted, and on March 28, 2006, Mr. Gillis was resentenced as a habitual felony offender to concurrent terms of life in prison on the robbery and kidnapping charges and as a habitual felony offender to thirty years in prison on the aggravated battery charge. Mr. Gillis appealed the resentencing order in April 2006, and while his appeal was pending, he filed a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion with the postconviction court. In December 2006, the postconviction court granted Mr. Gil-lis’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion in part and ordered that Mr. Gillis again be resen-tenced, this time to delete the habitual felony offender designation on the robbery and kidnapping charges because the designation constituted a double jeopardy violation. As a result of the postconviction court’s order, Mr. Gillis filed a notice of dismissal, and his rule 3.800(a) appeal was dismissed. Gillis v. State, 959 So.2d 262 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (table decision).
Mr. Gillis did not file his rule 3.850 motion until September 27, 2007, more than two years after his direct review proceedings were concluded. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). Mr. Gillis’s resen-tencing, which resulted not from his direct appeal but from his successful rule 3.800 motions, did not toll the two-year time limit for filing a rule 3.850 motion attacking his convictions. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b); O’Neill v. State, 6 So.3d 630, 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); Marrero v. State, 967 So.2d 934, 936 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Instead of considering Mr. Gillis’s claims on the merits, the postconviction court should have denied it as untimely. However, we affirm the denial because the postconviction court reached the right result, despite the unnecessary review. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla.2002) (“Th[e] longstanding principle of appellate law, sometimes referred to as the ‘tipsy coachman’ doctrine, allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons,’ so long as ‘there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record.’ ”).
Affirmed.
WHATLEY and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Russell v. State, 100 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…2010, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.850. We affirm without further comment as to claims two and three. As for claim one, we affirm but on a basis different from the one relied on by the postconviction court. See, e.g., Gillis v. State, 32 So. 3d 681, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). In his postconviction motion, Russell alleged newly discovered evidence in the form of a January 20, 2010, affidavit in which the victim recanted her original allegations. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 678 So. 2d 1232, 1235…
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Ednol A. Hanna v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)
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Jean-Philippe v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr. (Duval County) (M.D. Fla. 2024)…la. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1)). “The two-year limitation is not tolled by other collateral proceedings filed in the trial court, even if a corrected sentence is entered.” Joseph v. State, 835 So. 2d 1221, 1222 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Gillis v. State, 32 So. 3d 681, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding that defendant's resentencing, which occurred after direct review proceedings concluded, did not toll two-year time limit for filing Rule 3.850 motion); Zeigler v. State, 632 So.2d 48, 50 (Fla. 1993) (although defend…
Authorities Cited
- Swett v. State, 829 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002)
- Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2002)
- Marrero v. State, 967 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- O'Neill v. State, 6 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)