PRESIDENTS' COUNCIL OF SD, INC., HOLLIS RISLEY, ANNE WHITE, AND JAMES WATLING, APPELLANTS,
v.
WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND BAYTOWNE COMMERCIAL JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS II, AND HOWARD ROCK FEE, LLC, APPELLEES
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The appellants challenged a development order issued by Walton County's Director of Planning and Zoning, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to contest its consistency with the local comprehensive plan. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the appellees, finding the action was untimely under Florida Statute § 163.3215(3), which requires such actions be filed within 30 days of the order's rendition. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the appellants failed to meet the jurisdictional deadline.
The circuit court properly entered summary judgment for the appellees because the appellants' action was untimely. The failure to bring the action within the time allowed under § 163.3215(3) constitutes a jurisdictional defect. The order was rendered when filed with the Department's clerk, and the appellants' filing occurred well after the 30-day deadline had expired.
[1] An action for declaratory or injunctive relief to contest a development order's consistency with a local comprehensive plan must be filed within thirty days following ren…
[2] Rendition of a signed written order occurs when it is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 163.3215(3) provides that an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to contest a development order's consistency with a local comprehensive plan must be filed no later than thirty days following rendition of the order, or when all local administrative appeals are exhausted, whichever occurs later.”
Establishes the statutory deadline for filing challenges to development orders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning issued a development order for appellee Walton County. The appellants filed a circuit court acti…
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The appellants challenge the circuit court’s final summary judgment for the *765appellees in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. That action was filed in connection with a development order issued by the Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning for the appellee Walton County. Among other grounds for summary judgment, the circuit court properly determined that the action for declaratory and injunctive relief was untimely under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes.
Section 163.3215(3) provides that an action for declaratory or injunctive relief to contest a development order’s consistency with a local comprehensive plan must be filed no later than thirty days following rendition of the order, or when all local administrative appeals are exhausted, whichever occurs later. In the present case there were no administrative appeals. The appellants’ circuit court action was filed long after the thirty-day time limit under section 163.3215(3) had expired, as the order was rendered when it was filed with the clerk for the Department of Planning and Zoning. Although the Department clerk’s job title did not expressly identify her as the clerk and she also had other duties, the record establishes that she was the person in charge of such filings and that being the records clerk was a major part of her job responsibilities.
The appellants’ failure to bring their circuit court action within the time allowed under section 163.3215(3) is a jurisdictional defect, upon which summary judgment was properly entered as to the section 163.3215 action. See 5220 Biscayne Blvd., LLC v. Stebbins, 937 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Although the order in 5220 Biscayne was rendered when filed with the City Clerk, that order was entered upon approval by the City Commission and under signature of the mayor, rather than by an official for another administrative body with its own clerk. The development order in the present case was entered by the Director of the Department of Planning and Zoning, which is the lower tribunal as described in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(e), as the agency or body whose order is to be reviewed. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h) defines rendition as the date when a signed written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal, and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(b) describes the clerk as the person specifically designated as such, or who most closely resembles a clerk in the functions performed. In the present case, the Department’s clerk was the clerk of the lower tribunal and summary judgment was properly entered on the appellants’ section 163.3215 claim because it was not brought within the jurisdictional time limits provided in section 163.3215(3).
AFFIRMED.
BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Sumner v. Bd. of Trs., 78 So. 3d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…no person or official has been specifically so designated, the official or agent who most closely resembles a clerk in the functions performed” is the agency clerk. Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(b); see also Presidents’ Council of SD, Inc. v. Walton County, 36 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that the agency clerk was the person in charge of filing the agency’s administrative orders even though her job title did not expressly identify her as the clerk); see generally § 175.061(2), Fla. Stat. (2010) (provi…
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Haines O'Neil v. Walton Cnty., 149 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…well beyond the 30-day statutory deadline for challenging the 2010 Order, a jurisdictional impediment for the court to consider changes wrought by the 2010 Order. § 163.8215(3), Fla. Stat,; see also Presidents’ Council of SD, Inc. v. Walton County, 36 So. 3d 764, 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). We therefore affirm the summary judgment order entered by the circuit court on the CCCL-related issue. 2. The 2013 Order didn’t “alter" the property by authorizing residential construction on the primary dune in the CPZ.…
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Pettway v. City OF Jacksonville, 264 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…l proceeding, the filing of the ordinance at issue with a government clerk or the person '... who most closely resembles a clerk in functions performed ' determines the date of 'rendition.' " (quoting Presidents' Council of SD, Inc. v. Walton Cty. , 36 So. 3d 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ). The trial court agreed with Saleebas that rendition of the ordinance occurred on May 25, 2016, because the ordinance was "filed" on that date with "the City's Office of Legislative Services and available for public review on t…
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