WESLEY JAY FARRAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Farrar appealed his resentencing on burglary and sexual battery charges classified as life felonies. The trial court originally imposed concurrent 40-year sentences, but resentenced him to consecutive sentences (40 years plus 10 years) after conceding legal error. The court affirmed the new sentences as a valid means to accomplish the original sentencing intent.
The court affirmed the resentencing, holding that a trial court may impose consecutive sentences after vacating concurrent sentences in response to a motion to correct illegal sentence in order to effect the original sentencing intent, as long as the new sentences do not exceed the original sentences. The court also held that double jeopardy and statute of limitations challenges to underlying convictions are not cognizable in a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, which addresses sentences rather than convictions.
[1] A trial court may impose consecutive sentences after vacating concurrent sentences in response to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, in order to effect the intent o…
[2] Challenges to underlying criminal convictions are not cognizable in a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2).
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court may impose consecutive sentences after vacating concurrent sentences in response to a motion to correct illegal sentence, in order to effect the intent of the original sentencing court, as long as the newly-imposed sentences are no longer than the original sentences”
Establishes the legal standard for resentencing and the authority of trial courts to impose consecutive sentences to accomplish original sentencing intent while remaining within statutory bounds.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFarrar committed burglary with assault and sexual battery on September 22, 1990. He pleaded guilty on May 21, 2008, to negotiated concurrent sentences…
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Wesley Jay Farrar appeals from his resentencing on charges of burglary of *266a dwelling with an assault, reclassified to a life felony,1 and sexual battery with use of actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury, a life felony,2 for offenses he committed on September 22, 1990. Farrar pled to the charges on May 21, 2008. He was originally given the sentences he negotiated with the State — concurrent sentences of forty years in prison, followed by ten years of sex offender probation. Resentencing was prompted by Farrar’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, in which he argued that the statute covering life felonies at the time of his offenses provided for a sentence of natural life or a term-of-years sentence not to exceed forty years. The State conceded error based on Ward v. State, 558 So.2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). On resentenc-ing, the trial court accomplished the same sentencing goal by imposing a forty-year prison sentence on the first charge, and a consecutive ten-year prison sentence on the second charge. We affirm the sentences. See, e.g., Everett v. State, 824 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (recognizing that a trial court may impose consecutive sentences after vacating concurrent sentences in response to a motion to correct illegal sentence, in order to effect the intent of the original sentencing court, as long as the newly-imposed sentences are no longer than the original sentences).
After imposition of the sentences below, Farrar also filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), in which he attempted to raise double jeopardy and statute of limitations challenges to one of the charges. The motion was denied, and Farrar makes the same arguments on appeal. We do not believe that these challenges to Farrar’s underlying convictions are cognizable in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See Rodriguez v. State, 958 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding trial court properly denied defendant relief under rule 3.800(b)(2) where defendant attempted to attack his conviction, rather than his sentence, with a double jeopardy argument); Echeverria v. State, 949 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding trial court properly denied relief under rule 3.800(b)(2) where defendant attempted to attack his convictions, rather than his sentences, with argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of, or raise before the court, meritorious statute of limitations defenses). As such, the rule 3.800(b)(2) motion was properly denied.
Even if we were to reach the substance of these arguments, however, we find no merit in them. Statutes of limitations on crimes are not jurisdictional, and may be waived. E.g., Doyle v. State, 783 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 796 So.2d 536 (Fla.2001). In entering his 2008 pleas, Farrar expressly waived any statute of limitations defense in this case. Farrar also waived any double jeopardy claim by entering into his bargained-for plea agreement, which the record reflects that he knowingly and voluntarily did to avoid a life sentence. See, e.g., Melvin v. State, 645 So.2d 448 (Fla.1994); Novaton v. State, 634 So.2d 607 (Fla.1994); Laurore v. State, 3 So.3d 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Mandelbaum v. State, 676 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
AFFIRMED.
MONACO, C.J., SAWAYA and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Earvin Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…ding that the statute of limitations defense does not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction; to the extent the statute of limitations may be considered in any sense a jurisdictional impediment, it is one which can be waived); Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265, 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (observing that “[sjtatutes of limitations on crimes are not jurisdictional, and may be waived”); Morris, 909 So. 2d at 431 (same); Lowe v. State, 501 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (noting that “[ijn Florida, statutes of lim…1 / 2
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Taurean K. Wilkerson v. State, 128 So. 3d 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…of a double jeopardy claim. However, such case law applies to [*190] double jeopardy claims raised on direct appeal, not collateral appeal. See Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla.1994); Melvin v. State, 645 So. 2d 448 (Fla.1994); Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). For double jeopardy claims raised in a collateral rule 3.850 matter, the fact that the defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement does not preclude him from seeking review of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim wh…
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Thompson v. State, 74 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…ntences in order to effect the intent of the original sentencing court, as long as the newly imposed sentence [is] not longer than the originally imposed sentence.” Everett v. State, 824 So. 2d 211, 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); see also Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). Here, the total sentence imposed under the new sentencing scheme is 45 years, whereas the originally imposed sentence provided for a total sentence of 30 years. Accordingly, the order of January 12, 2011, resentencing appellant…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Novaton v. State, 634 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1994)
- Melvin v. State, 645 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1994)
- Ward v. State, 558 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Everett v. State, 824 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)
- Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- Edwardo De Juan v. State, 249 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
- Doyle v. State, 783 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Rodriguez v. State, 958 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Mandelbaum v. State, 676 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Laurancia Laurore v. State, 3 So. 3d 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009)