EDWARDO DE JUAN
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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A rule 3.800(a) motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge the sufficiency of evidence underlying a conviction, and attempted escape from lawful confinement constitutes the crime of escape under Florida law.
[1] A motion filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, is not the correct procedural vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying criminal co…
[2] Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised in any type of collateral postconviction motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDe Juan was convicted by jury in 2011 of escape and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He filed a rule 3.800(a) motion in May 2017 arguing that bec…
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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________
No. 1D18-0105 _____________________________
EDWARDO DE JUAN,
Appellant,
v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Taylor County. Gregory S. Parker, Judge.
April 30, 2018
PER CURIAM. Following a jury trial in 2011, Appellant was convicted of escape and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In May 2017, Appellant filed a motion in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, seeking to correct what Appellant claimed was an illegal sentence. In his motion, Appellant contended that the elements of escape were not met because he only went onto the roof of Taylor Correctional Institution while he was in custody and did not actually leave the prison. See § 944.40, Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing the elements of escape and establishing the crime as a second degree felony). Appellant therefore argued that he was at worst guilty of
2
attempted escape. The trial court dismissed the motion and Appellant brought this appeal.
Rule 3.800 is “not the correct procedural vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying criminal conviction.” Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised in any kind of collateral postconviction motion. See Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[C]laims of insufficient evidence have long been held to be procedurally barred in collateral proceedings.”). The trial court was therefore correct to dismiss the rule 3.800(a) motion.
Furthermore, even if Appellant was correct and he was guilty of only attempted escape, an attempt to escape from lawful confinement satisfies that element of the crime of escape. See Keel v. State, 438 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 27.1. Escape, whether attempted or completed, is a second degree felony under section 944.40, punishable by up to fifteen years in prison pursuant to section 775.082(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2010). Appellant’s fifteen year sentence was lawful.
AFFIRMED.
B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and BILBREY and JAY, JJ., concur.
_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
_____________________________
Edwardo De Juan, pro se, Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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Edwardo De Juan v. State, 249 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)…as at worst guilty of attempted escape. The trial court dismissed the motion and Appellant brought this appeal. Rule 3.800 is “not the correct procedural vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying criminal conviction.” Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be raised in any kind of collateral postconviction motion. See Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[C]laims of insufficient evidence have long b…
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Farrar v. State, 42 So. 3d 265 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…tate, 958 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (holding trial court properly denied defendant relief under rule 3.800(b)(2) where defendant attempted to attack his conviction, rather than his sentence, with a double jeopardy argument); Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding trial court properly denied relief under rule 3.800(b)(2) where defendant attempted to attack his convictions, rather than his sentences, with argument that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of, o…
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Dillon Mathew Voegele v. State, 303 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)…d warned him against filing frivolous claims. Voegele now appeals this order. We affirm. Voegele’s claim that he should have been charged by indictment rather than by information is not cognizable under rule 3.800(a). See Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (explaining that rule 3.800 is “not the correct procedural vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying criminal conviction”). His claim that his life sentences for sexual battery on a child violate the constitution…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
- Edwardo De Juan v. State, 249 So. 3d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
- Keel v. State, 438 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Brown v. McNEIL, 41 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)