CITY OF SUNNY ISLES BEACH, APPELLANT,
v.
TEMPLE B'NAI ZION, INC., APPELLEE
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The trial court abused its discretion by issuing a de facto injunctive order that failed to comply with the legal requirements of Rule 1.610 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
[1] An order that preserves the status quo to prevent irreparable harm before a dispute is resolved constitutes a temporary injunction, regardless of its styling.
[2] A temporary injunction is legally insufficient and reversible on appeal if it fails to demonstrate that immediate and irreparable injury will result from its denial.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Temple sought to prevent the City from designating its property a historic site. The Temple requested mediation, which the City refused. The Templ…
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Upon learning that the Historical Preservation Board of the City of Sunny Isles Beach (the “City”) was planning to hold a hearing to vote on whether to designate Temple B’Nai Zion (the “Temple”) a historic site, and thereby thwart the Temple’s plans for demolition and expansion, the Temple requested that the City participate in nonbinding mediation to resolve the dispute. When the City refused, the Temple obtained from the circuit court an order to show cause why that court should not issue a -writ of mandamus (the “Order”).1 The Order further provided that “[djuring the pendency of this case, the City may not designate the aforementioned property as a historic site.” Upon review, we find the Order to be legally insufficient and therefore reverse.
Our standard of review affords a trial court broad discretion in granting temporary injunctions, Sacred Family Invs., Inc. v. Doral Supermkts., Inc., 20 So.3d 412, 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (quoting Carricarte v. Carricarte, 961 So.2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)), and “we must affirm unless the appellant establishes that the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion.” Cohen Fin., LP v. KMC/EC II, LLC, 967 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Millennium Commc’ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. State, 761 So.2d 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)).
The Temple argues that the order was not a temporary injunction because the underlying proceeding was a petition for a writ of mandamus and therefore the order “simply impose[d] a brief ‘stay’ on the proceedings” to “preserve the status quo.” However, “[t]he *906very purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo in order to prevent irreparable harm from occurring before a dispute is resolved. The Order in this case, by preserving the status quo ... clearly constituted a temporary injunction.” Camji v. Helmsley, 602 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (citations omitted); see also Spradley v. Old Harmony Baptist Church, 721 So.2d 785, 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that although an order is not styled as such, its language “is nevertheless injunctive and must comply with the requirements for issuance of an injunction”). Therefore, “[w]e agree with petitioners that because the subject order is in the nature of an injunction, it ... is reviewable as a non-final order granting an injunction pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(B), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Rodriguez ex rel. Posso-Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 734 So.2d 1162, 1163 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (citations omitted).
The City’s arguments regarding the legal insufficiency of the injunction are well taken. We agree that the Order to Show Cause
does not meet the requirements for an injunction as set forth by Rule 1.610 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Order does not show that immediate and irreparable injury will result if the injunction is not entered, or that counsel for the defendants had certified in writing regarding any efforts that have been made to give advance notice regarding the hearing, or any reasons why such notice should not have been required.... Under such circumstances, a temporary injunction order is defective and is reversible on appeal.
Camji 602 So.2d at 618; see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1)(A),(B). The Order is further defective because Rule 1.610 also
requires a court’s injunctive order to “specify the reasons for entry” of the injunction, and this court has emphasized that “[cjlear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of the four conclusions[2] necessary to justify entry of a preliminary injunction.” [City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co., 634 So.2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)]. The court’s order in this ease does not contain any findings or provide any reasons for issuing the injunction.
Spradley, 721 So.2d at 737; Bieda v. Bieda, 42 So.3d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610(c). Finally, “[u]nder Rule 1.610[ (b) ] ... the court should have required that a bond be posted. Failure to do so is reversible error.” Spradley, 721 So.2d at 738 (citing United Farm Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (finding error in failure to require a bond where Rule 1.610(b) requires bond and no rule exceptions applies); Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So.2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)).
We hold that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by entering a de facto injunctive order that failed to comply with the legal requirements of Rule 1.610. Such an order cannot stand.
Reversed and remanded.
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Lutsky v. Schoenwetter, 172 So. 3d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…the injunction and contain clear, definite and unequivocal findings of fact to support the four elements of an injunction. Angelino v. Santa Barbara Enter., LLC, 2 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); City of Sunny Isles Beach v. Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc., 43 So. 3d 904, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). The order in this case does not contain the necessary findings. Neither did the moving party meet her burden of alleging and proving the facts entitling her to relief. Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1089…
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CJM P'rs, LLC v. Minerva Di Giacomo, 187 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)…dverse party is wrongfully enjoined.” The trial court’s issuance of a temporary injunction withóut setting a bond and requiring its posting, pursuant to rule 1.610(b), was an abuse of discretion. City of Sunny Isles Beach v. Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc., 43 So. 3d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).2 We reverse the order on appeal, with one exception. We affirm that portion of [*879] the order which, as.stipulated to by CJM, Minerva Di Giacomo, and Jesus Arancibia, provided that CJM may “transfer the shares of Futsal Center…
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Orange Cnty. v. Fla. Ass'n FOR Constitutional Officers, Inc., 229 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…ant, continue, modify, or dissolve injunctions.” Pursuant to this rule, district courts have the authority to review orders that, although not labeled an. injunction, grant injunctive relief. See City of Sunny Isles Beach v. Temple B’Nai Zion, Inc., 43 So. 3d 904, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Cone v. Anderson, 944 So. 2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Here, the trial court’s order barred the County from implementing and enforcing the Charter amendments until further order of the court and, thus, constitutes a no…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- City OF Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Millennium Commc'ns & Fulfillment v. Off. of the Attorney Gen., 761 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- United Farm Workers OF Am., AFL-CIO v. Quincy Corp., 681 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Carricarte v. Carricarte, 961 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Isabella Rodriguez v. Richard J. Feinstein, M.D. & Richard J. Feinstein, M.D., P.A., 734 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Cohen Fin., LP v. Kmc/Ec II, LLC, 967 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
- Murray Bieda v. Mimi Bieda, 42 So. 3d 859 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)
- In the Interest of Baby BOY B, 602 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Camji v. Helmsley, 602 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)