GIOVANNA SINQUIN WALKER, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

LAWSON, J.

Giovanna Sinquin Walker appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which sought dismissal of a 2009 information charging him with purchase of cannabis. Walker is serving a federal prison sentence in Ohio, and acknowledges that Florida’s speedy trial rule does not afford him any relief.1 However, Walker alleges that he is entitled to relief *916under the speedy trial provision in the United States and Florida Constitutions, and under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”), section 941.45, Florida Statutes, and 18 U.S.C. Appendix.2 We affirm.

With respect to Walker’s IADA claim, the trial court found that Walker had “not yet filed the documents required to trigger the provisions of this act.” Walker has not demonstrated any error in this ruling. Powers v. Powers, 831 So.2d 724, 724 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (“An appellant has the burden to bring forward a record adequate to demonstrate reversible error because we presume the decision of a trial court to be correct”) (citations omitted). Additionally, we note that “IADA violations are uncognizable in habeas proceedings, absent a showing that the violation prejudiced the rights of the accused by ‘affect[ing] or impugning] the integrity of the fact finding process’ at trial.” Hunter v. Samples, 15 F.3d 1011, 1012 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Seymore v. Alabama, 846 F.2d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 816, 102 L.Ed.2d 806 (1989)).

Walker has also failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s handling of his speedy trial argument. “[T]he determination of whether a person has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial depends in large part upon the consideration of four elements: (1) length of delay, (2) reason for delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to be tried speedily, and (4) prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” State v. Blankenship, 422 So.2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). Walker’s filing with the trial court addressed only the first element, length of delay. As such, he could not establish a constitutional speedy trial violation. Id. We also note that the IADA provides a method through which Walker can secure a timely resolution of the charges against him. See § 941.45, Fla. Stat. (2009) (IADA, Art. 111(a)) (requiring that a prisoner be brought to trial within 180 days after submitting a proper request for disposition under the IADA). If the reason for delay in this case is Walker’s own failure to follow the procedure set forth in the IADA, we fail to see how Walker could establish a constitutional speedy trial violation.

AFFIRMED.

EVANDER and COHEN, JJ„ concur.